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ABSTRACT
State failure is becoming increasingly prevalent across the globe, creating human suffering, black
markets, lost economic opportunities, and safe havens for militant actors. It is imperative that the
international community find a way to combat state failure. This study investigates the effects of
irregular leadership transitions on state failure recovery.
Irregular leadership transitions occur when the executive of a state comes to power through
unconstitutional means. Regular leaders are more likely than irregular leaders to have personal
experience as a ruler, beneficial domestic and international ties, and familiarity among the
population. Irregular transitions may damage bureaucracies, damaging government functionality
and halting development projects that had already been underway. Regular leaders benefit from a
legacy that was likely able to pass spoils onto an elite group. This elite group is likely to resist
relative losses to power more than lower status groups would fight to gain power because of the
cognitive principles of risk aversion, and the sensitivity to status inherent to social identity
theory. Regular leaders also have traditional legitimacy, while irregular leaders are more likely to
have to gain legitimacy.
State failure and failure recovery are overdetermined, so it is impossible to be able to confidently
determine the direction of causal flow. Every determinant of failure is related to every other, and
it is difficult to separate their effects. The role of leadership regularity is therefore investigated as
a proxy that can predict variation on the rate of failure recovery.
The quantitative analysis consisted of multi and bivariate regressions investigating the effects of
leadership regularity on failure duration, as well as the relative explanatory power held by
several factors associated with leadership regularity. Robustness checks were performed using
Bayesian statistics, and survival analyses. Irregular leadership transitions were found to predict a
roughly five year increase in state failure duration.
The Afghan Civil War was used as an illustrative case, describing the ways in which Daoud,
Taraki, Amin, Karmal, Massoud, Hekmatyar, and Mullah Omar all overcame, or failed to
overcome, different obstacles associated with their irregularity and how these obstacles affected
their relative levels of success attempting to extend governance.
Thesis Supervisor: Fotini Christia
Title: Assistant Professor of Political Science
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The Toppler' Effect:
Irregular leader transitions and the rate of state failure recovery
Laila Wahedi
Introduction
The problem of failed states has become increasingly potent in modem history. In a
largely globalized world, the domestic affairs of one country have an impact on the entire
international community. Much research has been dedicated to the factors that lead to state
failure recovery, but as is usually the case in a field dominated by structuralist arguments, too
little attention has been focused on the leaders themselves.
Although scholars have speculated on the role of governance and governing institutions
on failure recovery, especially in specific cases, no comprehensive work has yet attempted to
categorize rulers by whether they have executive experience, or to identify the factors that allow
a leader to successfully consolidate control over a territory. Despite the use of coups and forcible
regime changes, little attention has been paid to whether regularly ascending or irregular rulers
are more capable of extending state power of a territory in order to recover from state failure. On
the one hand, it might seem intuitive to suspect that old and corrupt leaders are the cause of the
failure, and thus that new leaders are arbiters of change and recovery. However, there is no
reason to suspect a new leader to be any less corrupt or more competent than their predecessor.
In fact, there are many factors that are more associated with regular leaders that are likely to
'The Toppler Effect is a word play combining "topple," as in a the removal of a ruler, and the Doppler Effect-a
principle of physics that occurs when waves emitted from a moving object move faster in the direction the object is
traveling and slower in the backwards direction, relative to a stationary observer. For example, when a noise-making
object travels towards an observer, the noise sounds higher pitched, (the sound waves have a greater frequency).
Once it has passed the observer, the noise sounds lower pitched, (the sound waves have a lower frequency).
Similarly, the Toppler Effect predicts that before an irregular leadership-change event, (the event is analogous to the
object passing the observer,) the rate, or frequency, of recovery is greater than after the leadership-change event.
contribute to state failure recovery. The next section will assess the literature and describe the
theoretical underpinnings behind these factors. The following section will operationalize relevant
variables. The next section contains a quantitative analysis, followed by an illustrative case
featuring a series of leaders during the Afghan Civil War and a brief conclusion.
Literature and Theory
With Woodrow Wilson's declaration of America's commitment to self determination, the
norm of colonization was broken and the Westphalian idea of state sovereignty was, at least
theoretically, extended throughout the world. Wars have continued to be waged, but the norm
has shifted from one of colonizing and conquering territory to one of fixed borders and a global
impetus to protect those fixed borders in order to preserve the status quo.
In theory, the idea of fixed borders seems very equitable and peaceable. If states, on the
whole, have reduced their conquest ambitions, then it might follow that there would be less
interstate war. However, there is a dark side: an increased prevalence of intrastate conflict and
instability. Charles Tilly described the formation of European states through military competition
during which weakened regions were conquered (1985). But when fixed borders are the norm,
weakened areas are left to fester and conflict can continue indefinitely.
The failure of a coercive state occurs when its government no longer maintains a
monopoly over legitimate use of force within its territory, resulting in ungoverned territories.
The failed state cannot extend governance to, nor extract resources from, these regions because
another group challenges its legitimate use of force and its control in the area. In the most
extreme form of failure, the majority of the country is not governed by the state authority, if such
an authority even exists, and civil war ensues. Examples would be Afghanistan in 1978, or
Somalia today. In more mild forms, only certain swathes remain ungoverned. On the other
extreme, the UK maintained control over the majority of its territory in between 1971 and 1982,
but failed to extend governance into Northern Ireland because the IRA challenged state authority
and monopoly over violence. Any ungoverned territory leaves the population without access to
state provided services such as security and results in domestic humanitarian concerns as well as
concerns for the international community-they provide safe havens for terrorists and other
militant actors launching into neighboring states, represent lost economic opportunities and
resources, and are home to illicit weapon, human, organ, drug, and WMD trafficking.
As the threats from interstate war decreased since the Second World War, the threats
from intrastate conflict and instability have increased. Over half of the worlds states are weak,
failing, or failed, (Hanlon, 2010), and while global trends for state fragility have improved
slightly in the past fifteen years, the prospects for these states are still grim, (Marshall & Cole,
2009). Because these ungoverned territories are so dangerous, much scholarship has been
dedicated to an attempt to understand what makes a state fail and what helps a state to recover
from failure. The present study investigates one factor related to state failure recovery: the
effects of irregular leader succession.
Much research on conflict and failure relies heavily on rational choice based approaches,
assuming that parties to a conflict behave in rational ways. These theories go a long way,
describing how alliances between groups shift to prolong conflict (Christia, 2008), commitment
issues and other barriers to conflict resolution (Mason & Fett, 1996; Mattes & Savun, 2009;
Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Kirschner, 2010), the efficacy of intervention (Fortna, 2008), and the
role of class based preferences in shaping policy and institution (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001).
Rational choice is based off the assumption that humans generally behave rationally and that
given the proper information, they will behave in similarly rational ways. However, rational
choice only goes so far when dealing with real humans. This is not to suggest that rational choice
does not contribute to our understanding of civil conflict and instability, rather that something is
missing from the approaches we currently employ to understand conflict, and as such, that we
have an incomplete understanding. Human rationality is bound and constrained by cognitive
processes. By placing an emphasis on rational choice explanations of behavior, the literature on
leadership and cognitive psychology largely gets ignored. Instead, cognitive constraints on
rationality should be incorporated into any analysis of conflict.
The overreliance on rational choice based explanations leads to a general dismissal of
leadership-if states behave purely rationally, a certain level of sameness can be attributed to all
regimes with similar structural characteristics, thereby excluding variation arising from leaders
themselves, and how they interact with diverse populations. This is a dangerous assumption to
make, especially when the leader is not constant and thus when variations due to leadership are
not constant. Leaders in different situations interact with their constituencies and their
environments in different ways, and have different access to different resources based on who
they are. Together, rational arguments and cognitive approaches can be used to examine the
efficacy of different types of leaders in order to paint a more complete picture of state failure,
and the factors that contribute to failure recovery. Specifically, given their differing situations,
how do irregularly ascending leaders and regular leaders differ in their ability to reconsolidate
control over failed states?
Regular leadership transitions occur when a ruler is replaced through constitutional
means. Even when a state lacks a formal Constitution, traditions and norms direct how, when,
and by who the executive or ruler is replaced. Irregular leadership transitions occur when
constitutional norms and traditions are broken. It is not enough for the old leader to be deposed
in an irregular way; in order to constitute an irregular leadership transition; the ascension of the
new leader must be irregular. A transition might be classified as regular even if a ruler is
assassinated, as long as they are replaced in a constitutional manner. For example, if a vice
president succeeds an assassinated president with the acceptance of the governing body
responsible for sanctioning the executive, then the transition is regular. If a president is
assassinated and there is a forced takeover of the government, the transition is irregular.
The newness of a leader is less important than whether they are regular. New regular
leaders differ from new irregular leaders because the new regular leaders can benefit from the
resources at the disposal of the old leader. They act in their place and assume their role, rather
than needing to establish themselves. Regular and irregular leaders, on the other hand, differ
considerably overall in the formal and informal assets they can utilize, and the way that they
interact with and are perceived by the public. Some of these assets may arise, at least in part,
from a given leader's regularity. Others may merely be proxied by leadership regularity, and may
arise in part from the circumstances which either kept a regular leader in, or brought an irregular
leader to power. In either case, these assets are crucial in the case of state failure. Irregular
leaders are more likely to be at a disadvantage when attempting to reestablish state control unless
they are somehow able to access these assets.
The most obvious set of assets that are more likely to be available to regular leaders relate
to from increased experience in the executive position 2. An old leader has had time dealing with
governing in a failed state, and has thus had more of an opportunity to learn how to do so
effectively. Even a new but regular leader is likely to have more of an advantage than an
irregular leader-a new leader who comes to power through constitutional means is likely to
benefit from support mechanisms that are traditionally in place to ease the transition between
executives.
The executive is not the only one required to have experience in order for the government
to function; a strong bureaucracy is needed to carry out the everyday tasks of governing.
Irregular leader transitions, however, are likely to result in a bureaucratic shift. When an old
2 See green branches on trees in Appendix A.
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leader is deposed, their close supporters, party members, and ethnic kin all may be purged from
the government, or may leave voluntarily. This causes a loss of experience throughout the
government and means that for the same amount of effort, the bureaucratic machine is more
likely to keep rolling more efficiently for a regular leader than it would under an irregular leader.
This greater efficiency suggests that the regular leader will be able to direct his attention toward
creating stability, which could lead to a decreased propensity for civil conflict.
In a time of crisis, bureaucratic loss might be catastrophic. Stronger institutions are likely
to lead to an increased propensity for avoiding domestic conflict (Brownlee, 2007), and state
capacity, related to bureaucratic strength, predicts a decreased propensity for civil conflict onset
(Braithwaite, 2010). Peic and Reiter make a convincing institutional claim, suggesting that
foreign imposed regime changes only lead to civil war when the governing institutions of a state
have been damaged (2010). The argument can easily be extended from cases of foreign
intervention to any irregular leadership change during a violent crisis. For example, after the
soviet sponsored coup in Afghanistan, many experienced bureaucrats and technocrats left, others
were killed or imprisoned and were replaced by inexperienced party members who would toe the
party line but were ineffectual. Much of the army dissolved. The government was left non-
functional, and those development programs that the state had been attempting were abandoned
in favor of starting new programs from scratch, thereby losing all the invested time and resources
that had gone into the previous programs. Though the extent of bureaucratic loss experienced by
irregular leaders may vary, old leaders face no bureaucratic shifts, and new regular leaders are
more likely to be able to maintain the bureaucracy than irregular leaders. This predicts that the
stronger the formal institutions and bureaucracy of a state prior to an irregular transition, the
better that state will be able to function after the transition.
The experience and preservation of the bureaucracy favors regular leaders, but it is
possible for some irregular leaders to overcome this obstacle by taking care to retain the
institutions and bureaucracy of the old leader. If an irregular leader can retain the formal
institutions and bureaucracy of the old leader, then they will have a better functioning state and
more power. They will be more prepared to establish control if, for example, the military remains
intact, and the experienced technocrats remain in place. For example, when Hitler came to
power, he retained the elites and bureaucrats and in so doing, maintained a functioning
government. It was only later that he gradually began replacing them with party supporters3 .
Through their increased experience, regular leaders have also had time to gain personal
relationships with different power-holding groups both within and outside the country. Regular
leaders have had time to develop these personal connections, and as regular leaders, are likely to
have had personal connections and agreements passed down to them from previous leader.
Irregular leaders are more likely to have to start building their networks from scratch. By default,
regular leaders have had access to more sectors of the population, and have had more time to
form personal ties and patronage networks. While irregular leaders might attempt to make these
connections prior to taking power, they are always at a disadvantage because before they take
power they are unable to use their position to make assurances and build coalitions of support.
This means that regular leaders have had more time to make more effective connections with
greater ease, than irregular leaders.
These ties help leaders to gain funds, and to build the coalitions necessary to
reconsolidate power over a failed state. This is especially important in areas where the executive
depends on support from pockets of the population that might otherwise oppose the central
3 Though Hitler came to power legally, he did so through a loophole and created an effective regime change.
Because it was such a fundamental change, it can be compared to an irregular change in this regard.
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government. For example, in states with tribal structures, the executive depends on the support of
tribes. In pre- Soviet Invasion Afghanistan, the weak central monarchy traditionally depended on
personal connections with tribal groups to maintain control of the country. In Libya, it was not
until after the leadership of the country's two largest tribes declared their opposition to Ghaddafi
that the uprising against him was able to flourish. As an old leader, he had ties to these groups,
but when he lost his ties to the tribes, he lost considerable power.
Not only do old leaders have access to tangible advantages based on their experience, but
they also have several intangible, cognitive advantages. One example is the familiarity
preference. The easier something is to process, the more an individual prefers it (Winkielman,
Halberstadt, Fazendeiro, & Catty, 2006). This holds for basic sensory processing as well as for
more complex processing-the greater an individual's processing capacity, the more pleasing
that individual will judge a complex image or sound (Saffran, Loman, & Robertson, 2000; Smith
& Cuddy, 1986; Smith & Melara, 1990; Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004), sounds from
familiar languages are more pleasing and trustworthy, (Nazzi, Bertoncini, & Mehler, 1998;
Mehler, Jusczyk, Lambertz, Halsted, Bertoncini, & Amiel-Tison, 1988), and the more familiar a
face the more attractive and trustworthy an individual will judge the person to be (Langlois &
Roggman, 1990; Rubenstein, Kalakanis, & Langlois, 1999; Burton, Bruce, & Hancock, 1999;
Rhodes, 2005; Peskin & Newell, 2004). Old leaders have had plenty of time to become familiar,
and among the less polarized elements of the population, may appear more trustworthy than a
new leader.
It is tempting to discredit the value of familiarity. When groups are polarized, a given
side's champion is likely to be familiar to that group. In the case of ethnic divisions, the very
facial features of a leader will appear more familiar to their constituency than leaders from anther
ethnic group. However, an old leader has had a chance to publicize themselves among the entire
population. Their policies and way of doing business, even the corrupt ones, become familiar and
easier to understand. Everyone knows how to work within the system. Their quirks become
commonplace and no longer stand out. Furthermore, moderates, or at least those with median
views, shape the outcome of any contest of wills. Even if other factors, such as the ability to
mobilize resources, or relative power, play a larger role, the desires of the median citizen largely
impact the winner and the ease with which they take office. Appearing trustworthy to the least
polarized demographic could therefore be extremely beneficial. Similarly, in a multi-dimensional
decision-making space, or a society in which there are strong crosscutting cleavages, the
familiarity of an old leader will give them an advantage within every possible constituency.
Even in situations that are highly polarized, where there is no significant moderate
constituency, familiarity preference favors old leaders. While irregular leaders might have to
struggle to establish themselves as the predominant voice and the sole object of support among
their potential constituencies, old leaders have the benefit of already being familiar. Regular
leaders are established, and therefore likely to receive more unified support from their potential
constituencies. The party or constituency of an established regular leader is therefore less likely
to fragment, because it is clear who the constituency should support.
The familiarity preference may be the basis for another set of advantages more likely to
be possessed by regular leaders: representation of the elite group in society4. The familiarity
preference is believed to be a possible underlying mechanism behind social identity theory,
(Wahedi, p. working paper). Social identity theory is a useful framework for understanding the
effects that different leaders might have on a population. On a basic level, social identity theory
says that individuals have an in-group preference and an out-group prejudice (Tajfel & Turner,
4 See orange branches on the trees in Appendix A.
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1979). This means that they prefer other individuals within their in-group across a variety of
contexts from trust to recognition to altruistic actions to companionship (Kinzler, Dupoux, &
Spelke, 2007; Kinzler, Shutts, DeJesus, & Spelke, 2009; Kinzler, Corriveau, & Harris, 2010;
Leman & Lam, 2008; Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008). Not only do they prefer the in-
group, but they have a prejudice against the out-group: they are more likely to distrust and
dislike out-group members and are more likely to attribute blame or malicious intention to out-
group members.
On a basic level, social identity theory makes sense from a rational choice perspective: in
a world where resources are limited and unknowns pose threats, favoring the in-group is more
likely to be beneficial and safe for an individual. If group formation were purely rational, it
would not favor regular or irregular leaders, but the most powerful actors. But social group
biases transcend rationality: individuals show these biases even when it is against their best
interest (Brewer, 1999). Groups clash in ways that do not make sense strategically (Bornstein,
1992), participation within a given group is not always strategic for an individual, and
individuals tend to form groups even when there is no clear strategic advantage (Dawes &
Messick, 2000; Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner, 1997). Furthermore, social groups become part of an
individual's identity, meaning individuals cannot easily select into or out of a group rationally.
Social pressures from the community keep group members within their groups. Sometimes, these
social pressures are extremely strong, as is the case with ethnic groups5 . A person is born into
and raised in an ethnicity that can be more or less pronounced depending on the social context.
Even in states where ethnic groups are relatively less salient, they still play a role in how
5 While there is evidence that individuals can cross-identify with other ethnic groups, this is relatively rare and
generally occurs when the individual was raised with the ethnic group, granting them special privileges as an
honorary member.
6individuals identify themselves and with whom they align . The irrational and fixed nature of
social groups suggests that an irregular leader may have trouble co-opting support from the
groups that had supported their predecessor.
Co-opting support is made even more difficult for irregular leaders because of another
principle called cognitive dissonance, which makes social groups even less malleable. When
individuals hold conflicting beliefs or conduct an action that is in conflict with some of their
beliefs, they change them in order to reduce their cognitive dissonance. If they make a choice,
they change other beliefs to make the choice seem more rational, they justify it to themselves7.
Similarly, if an individual aligns themselves with a party, their beliefs will change in order to
justify that decision, making it harder to change parties even when it would be more rational to
do so. There is a cognitive barrier to changing a choice that suggests that even if an irregular
leader wields the power of the state, and even if it would be in the best interest for groups to
support him, groups who had supported his predecessor are less likely to shift their alliances.
On a first order approximation, the rigidity of social groups and social identity theory as a
whole might appear to suggest that a leader, either regular or irregular, who is more
representative of more of the population, or is part of a power sharing government, will more
effectively reduce conflict. However, social group interactions are not so simple-social groups
are sensitive to the status of their in-group. Although high status groups show the classical
pattern of in-group preference and out-group prejudice, low status groups sometimes adopt some
of the high status group's preferences and prejudices, perpetuating negative social stereotypes
(Baron & Banaji, 2009; Lane, Mitchell, & Banaji, 2003; Dasgupta, 2004).
6 As an example, consider the pressure on the Black community to vote for Barak Obama in the US 2008 election.
Ethnic identity played a role even in a state where ethnic ties are relatively less salient.
7 Once an individual makes a decision between two options, beliefs about the two options tend to become
increasingly polarized over time, even if the individual believed their merits were roughly equal in the beginning.
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Sensitivity to status adds another layer of complexity to the implications of social identity
theory, suggesting that merely being representative is not necessarily what causes a leader to be
effective, and explaining the observation that relative reversals of ethnic group status lead to
increased conflict. This sensitivity predicts that leaders that represent a high status group are
more likely to be successful, whether that group is the majority or not. Regular leaders' parties
tend to have held power for longer; they have been able to transfer spoils to the social groups that
traditionally favored them, granting them greater resources and influence in society9 . Regular
leaders can also to use their position to create a patronage network of support among the elite.
Regular leaders are also simply more likely to have elite support because they are the leaders
who survived without being deposed. Leadership regularity is therefore associated with elite
support.
Elite support is especially important to leaders in weak states. Elites control access to the
resources that leaders need to run a functioning government. For example, the Karzai
administration in Afghanistan focuses on taxing the elite without bothering to tax lower classes
because they provide the only non-negligible source of tax revenue (Crout, 2010; Zamzani,
2010). Elites are in the best position to challenge the leader's power, whether they control
important government positions, assets that the state needs access to, or territory. When elites
lose formal power, they are able to utilize their assets to manipulate the political system so that it
continues to favor them (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008).
8 The cost to losing an ethnic conflict are greater, so the cost to not fighting is greater. With more incentive to fight
on both sides, greater conflict arises.
9 This is not always the case. Sometimes an irregular leader transition is the result of the ascension of a leader that
does not represent the elite, such as Salvador Allende in Chile. Allende was a Marxist who failed to represent the
country's economic elite, and was subsequently deposed by Augusto Pinochet in a military coup. As a consolidated
democracy, however, Chile was a special case. Overall, regular leaders have had a greater opportunity to confer
spoils and create an elite constituency.
Support from high status groups is also important because any loss in power is likely to
be met with resistance. This resistance may be explained by the cognitive principle that humans
are loss averse. This means that people are more sensitive to loss than they are to gains and are
more willing to accept uncertainty in regards to gains than they are to loss. Given a choice,
individuals are more likely to gamble to increase their winnings than to decrease their loss (Pratt,
1962). The likelihood that an individual will take the gamble depends on the amount of risk, or
the likelihood of success, and the ratio of potential loss to potential gain. This means that given
the same level of risks, individuals are unwilling to accept uncertainty in regard to loss and are
willing to pay to reduce uncertainty, even when taking the risk is the statistically and rationally
superior option (Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, & Schwartz, 1997). Similarly, individuals will
work harder to avoid loss than they will to attain gains (Khaneman & Tversky, 1979). This
predicts that if an irregular leader brings a new group to power and takes away the spoils of
power from the old elite, the old elite are liable to resist. The old elite will not accept being
marginalized, whereas another group with grievances might have been appeased more easily.
Because irregular leaders necessarily have a transition from regular leadership, status drops are
more likely to occur during the onset of their tenure.
The effects of loss aversion can be seen in Afghanistan where the Pashtun tribe reacted
violently to a drop in status in the most recent Afghan war. Though they still maintain
predominance, a reduction in their relative power was enough to cause major opposition, even to
the Pashtun executive who is viewed as a Panjshiri puppet or sympathizero. The Karzai
administration attempted to co-opt some old power holders, such as the warlord Sayyaf, who
now holds a legislative seat, or the warlord Ismail Khan, who was a governor and is now a
10 This sentiment was apparent based on many interviews of Pashtuns throughout Kabul, where individuals are most
likely to support the government because it means a preservation of their way of life, and job security. This view
pervaded among government supporters as well opponents.
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minister. Other powerful actors have resisted the drop in status; Gulbuhdin Hekmatyar was
excluded from the new government and now sponsors an insurgent group. Similarly, the Sunni's
in Iraq lost power to the Shia majority and consequently were the largest supporters of the
insurgency. The Sunni party had been relatively secular, so their opposition was due more to
status than religious differences.
Losses of elite power and status have the potential to create opposition from powerful
groups and lead to prolonged state failure. Elite support is associated with regular leaders, and an
irregular leadership transition provides an opportunity in which elites may lose status and formal
power. Regular leadership therefore likely predicts shorter failure durations.
The final group of assets that leaders can access relates to their legitimacy to rule"
Leaders, both old and irregular, differ in the way they achieve their legitimacy. Max Weber was
among the first to attempt to characterize different types of leaders. He identified rational,
traditional and charismatic leaders (Weber & Parsons, 1964). Rational leaders derive their claim
to rule through a formal mechanism such as laws and a state. Democracies and autocracies can
both have rational leaders as long as their right to rule is dependent upon their fulfillment of their
responsibilities as heads of state. Citizens allow their rule because they provide the goods and
services that the citizens expect. Traditional leaders derive their claim to rule from historical
claims such as divine right or familial lineage. Their position is not contingent upon their
delivery of goods and services, but upon who they are or how they got there. Again, both
democracies and autocracies can have traditional leaders. Charismatic leaders differ from
rational and traditional leaders because their rule is not dependent upon independent
mechanisms, but rather their own personality. They are perceived to have superhuman
characteristics and command the devotion of their constituency. Weber's description of
" See blue branches on trees in Appendix A.
Charismatic leaders is extreme, and includes requires the populous to perceive the leader as
almost magical. A less extreme definition allows charisma to exist on a spectrum. The most
charismatic leaders may appear god-like, but leaders can still have some charismatic legitimacy
if their right to rule and their acceptance by the population is derived from their persona. Each
leader type maintains their right to rule in different ways, and therefore must behave differently
to maintain power.
Charismatic leaders interact differently with the population than other leaders. Their
charisma grants them leeway in their behavior and allows them to do things that might not be
accepted from rational or traditional leaders. For example, studies of US presidents show that
presidents scoring high on measures of narcissism and charisma have higher approval ratings,12
(Deluga, 1997; Deluga, 2001). Higher approval ratings might translate into greater amounts of
leeway and thus different behavior. Even in non-democracies, a leader's source of legitimacy
and power constrains their behavior. Two autocrats, Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya and Park
Chung-Hee behaved very differently. Chung-Hee was a rational leader who derived his support
from because he effectively championed modernization. As a leader, his actions were thus
constrained by the rationality of those who kept him in power. Chung-Hee behaved different
than Ghaddafi, who came to power as a nationalist and built a personality cult around himself.
As a charismatic leader, Ghaddafi was able to maintain his legitimacy while engaging in a wider
range of behaviors-until his fiscal irresponsibility went too far and he lost popular support.
Charismatic leaders, whether regular or irregular, are less constrained and more likely to receive
the popular support necessary to consolidate power.
1 Narcissism and charisma have been extensively linked. See Jerrold Post (1986) for a discussion of the appeal of
narcissist leaders to the public, and Rosenthal and Pittinsky (2006) for a review of the connections between
narcissism and leadership.
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Regular leaders have a certain amount of traditional legitimacy that irregular leaders tend
to lack because of the means by which they took power. Because regular leaders are more likely
to have better functioning bureaucracies and continuous development, they are also more likely
to have rational legitimacy. Their greater familiarity might also help regular leaders to build
personality cults around themselves, though it is also possible that irregular leaders take greater
care to establish their charismatic legitimacy because they face traditional legitimacy deficits.
Regular leaders are also more likely to have the support of the elite and high status groups, which
lends them legitimacy among the subgroups that have the power to overthrow them. Regular
leaders are more likely to have been recognized by the international community, while irregular
leaders must gain recognition after their ascension. International recognition also grants a leader
some legitimacy as the true executive of the state. Regular leaders are the ones who did not get
deposed, meaning that they held on to power either because they had greater support or greater
force. In either case, they are likely to have greater legitimacy than their deposed counterparts
and the irregular leaders who replaced them.
There are clearly many potential ties between leadership and prolonged conflict, and two
studies have explored the relationship between regime change and civil strife in particular. More
specifically, both investigated the use of regime change as a tool. Peic and Reiter find that
following an interstate war, foreign imposed regime changes (FIRCs) lead to civil war outbreak,
suggesting that if civil conflict is an unfavorable outcome, regime change may not be a wise
course of action (2010). They make an institutional argument, claiming that regime change
predicts civil war when the political institutions of the state have been damaged. They only
observe FIRCs, of which their data set contains only 40 cases, but their study suggests that a
change in leadership predicts conflict and that it would potentially prolonging state failure.
Alex Downes castes the implications of Piec and Reiter's findings into doubt with his
analysis (2010). He finds that FIRCs only lead to civil war when they bring a new leader to
power, and not when they restore an old leader to power. His explanation rests on legitimacy,
suggesting that FIRCs lead to civil war because when a foreign power imposes a new leader, that
leader is illegitimate unless they have some other claim to legitimacy. Old leaders do not have
the same drop in legitimacy as new leaders because they already had a claim on legitimacy-
they were not in power solely because a foreign power placed them there. If leadership change
only leads to conflict because foreign intervention reduces legitimacy, then it might follow that
non-intervention induced leadership changes would not lead to prolonged conflict. Such an
assumption, however, is overhasty.
Downes' theoretical claim concerns legitimacy far more than it concerns leader-specific
attributes in general. As such, his distinction between new-leader FIRCs and restoration FIRCs is
better described as a proxy for legitimacy, however he fails to test his assumption that it is a
good proxy. Legitimacy is difficult to operationalize, and he never attempts to justify this claim
with evidence, quantitative or qualitative. His use is particularly troublesome when looking at his
dataset: he includes ninety nine cases of FIRCs from 1820 to the present, but only twenty seven
were after 1945. In his pre-Wilsonian cases, nationalism was not yet as prevalent and the norms
of legitimacy were different. Furthermore, accepting his use of pre-1945 cases, restoration and
new leader FIRCs were not evenly distributed. There were only twenty-two restoration FIRCs,
nine of which were in the first ten cases and consisted of the actions of the quintuple alliance as
it restored monarchs across Europe. Another three consisted of European interventions in
European states during one of the world wars. It is hard to imagine those cases being very
comparable to the sort of FIRCs seen today or in more recent history, or to the new leader FIRCs
in his study. Robustness checks with different case selections were not preformed.
While Downes' finding that new leader FIRCs are different from restoration FIRCs is
questionable, both he and Peic and Reiter find that overall, FIRCs do lead to an increased
likelihood of civil war onset. Downes' legitimacy explanation seems insufficient in light of all
the potential effects of leadership change, and its persistence across swathes of time during
which legitimacy norms shifted. If legitimacy is not the only explanation, perhaps there are other
leader-specific factors that cause regime change to lead to civil conflict. And if these factors lead
to conflict onset, then perhaps they lead to conflict extension as well. The present paper
investigates the effects of irregular succession of leaders on state failure recovery in hopes of
understanding state failure a little bit better and predicting how likely states are to recover.
No single variable can claim complete explanatory power. Leadership change is just one
potential variable that is associated with a whole host of factors that prolong or curtail civil
conflict and state failure. Civil conflict occurs when there are grievances among a sector of the
population, and when the costs are low and potential gains are high (Acemoglu & Robinson,
2001). We can therefore predict whether conflict will occur in each situation based on how it
might affect these criteria.
13 Conflict resolution agreements tend to be more successful when they address these issues (Mattes & Savun,
2009).
Operationalization
To test the effects of irregular leadership transitions, all cases of state failure identified by
the Political Instability Task Force' (PITF) State Failure Problem Set as ethnic or revolutionary
failures were used (Marshall, Gurr, & Harff, 2010). This dataset was used both because its
selection mechanism corresponded with the present definition of state failure, and because it is
the best accepted list of failures in the field. Failure events were classified as events in which at
least one thousand or more people were mobilized and a total of one thousand were killed over
the course of the event, with at least one year reaching one hundred fatalities. At least 5% of the
fatalities must have been inflicted by the non-state side in order to classify it as state failure and
not a genocide or politicide, and to indicate that the state opposition posed a genuine threat to
state authority. Organized violence is a good measure of failure because it indicates a failure of
the state's hold over the monopoly of legitimate violence. States were classified as "failed" when
there was significant organized violence and were considered "recovered" when the violence was
terminated. Cases classified as failures solely on the basis of aversive regime change were
excluded because they were tautological14 and because regime change precipitated the failure;
they could not be considered a treatment on failure. Politicides and genocides were excluded
because they deviated from my definition of failure. While the state fails to deliver goods and
services to targeted groups, genocide and politicide do not necessarily represent an absence of
control in a region. There is a functioning state, whether or not it is an abusive state.
Only cases between the years of 1955 and 2004 were included for two reasons. First, the
problem set begins in 1955. It was not feasible to extend the study earlier, nor could I presume to
do a sufficient job in comparison to the entire team at the Political Instability Task Force. An
attempt to extend the problem set would have resulted in inconsistency and bias. However, even
14 Regime change leads to prolonged state failure because regime change leads to state failure.
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if the problem set could be extended, it should not be. Many of the measures used lack accurate
data for earlier years, in part because so many other scholars collecting data have used the PITF
and thus began their measurements in 1955, and in part because data for earlier years is
unavailable or unreliable. Even more importantly, cases from before circa-1955 are not
comparable to cases post-circa- 1955 because of the rise of nationalism and the establishment of
Wilsonian norms of fixed borders. The relationship between peoples and their rulers, as well as
treatment by the international community, changed, making 1955 a reasonable start date in a
study of modem failure and irregular leadership transitions.
Irregular leader changes were coded using the Archigos dataset of leaders (Goemans,
Gleditsch, & Chiozza, 2009). The Archigos dataset is among the most complete list of rulers and
ruler transitions covering the selected time period. It lists every year a ruler transitioned, and
specifies how. Irregular leadership changes occurred when a new leader took power through non-
constitutional means. A list of irregular and regular transitions can be found in Appendix B.
In addition to looking at failure durations, several other measures can be used to test the
theological underpinnings of the hypothesis. The effects of leadership transition depend upon
leaders' differing access to several assets of varying importance. Not all of these assets can be
feasibly measured, but some can, and their relative effects can be compared.
V2: Bureaucratic Strength
State infrastructures and bureaucracies are formal institutions that function at least semi-
independently of the top power-holders whereas informal institutions depend upon the elites and
power-holders. These institutions might include a formal tax collecting apparatus, whereas the
equivalent might be personal agreements with regional commanders. If a greater percentage of
the functions of the state were performed informally, an irregular leader might be at a
disadvantage. On the other hand, if a greater percentage were formalized institutions, they may
be utilized by the irregular leader, reducing the negative impact of irregular leader change.
Regular leaders can utilize formalized and informal mechanisms of governance, but irregular
leaders have access only to formal institutions and those connections they were able to develop
without the benefits of being heads of state. This predicts that stronger bureaucracies would
benefit irregular leaders more than regular leaders. This does not mean that strong formal
institutions will completely negate the effects of irregular leadership change, however. In an
irregular transition, it is likely that the institutions will either suffer, or have been weaker to
begin with. Experienced supporters of the old leaders may either be targeted, or leave
voluntarily, predicting that regular leaders have stronger bureaucratic strength. These two
predictions can be tested in order to illuminate the relative importance of bureaucratic strength
and experience as an explanatory factor in the effects of irregular leadership change.
Bureaucratic strength was measured with an in indicator of executive constraint, reported
by the Polity IV (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2010). The measure is a score ranging from 0,
where the leader is not constrained at all, to 7, where the leader is completely constrained.
Although this indicator does not measure the strength of institutions directly, it serves as a good
proxy. If the functioning of the government is dependent upon informal institutions, then it will
be easy for a leader to unilaterally make decisions and changes in policy, and will receive a low
constraint score. On the other hand, if there are strong formal institutions and a functioning
bureaucracy, the government will be able to chug along without a leader's personal connections,
and it will be harder for that leader to unilaterally and quickly make changes and implement
policies-resulting in a higher constraint score.
V3: Ethnic Power Shift
Groups threatened with a loss of power are likely to strongly resist the shift in power,
which predicts that new leaders who cause a shift in power are likely to have prolonged failure.
Irregular leaders are more likely to cause shifts because their ascension was a transition point at
which such a shift could have been made. Regular leaders are more likely to have the support of
the elite because their position allowed them to make their constituency elite.
There are many types of shifts in power, ranging from a few elites being removed from
high level positions, to the reduction in status of an entire party or ethnic group. Shifts in ethnic
status were used because of data availability and because such shifts have wide-reaching
repercussions throughout society. The measure of ethnic shifts in power was derived from the
Elite Characteristics Dataset composed by Barbara Harf and Tedd Gurr, and included in the PITF
frequently tested variables database (Harff & Gurr, 2000). The dataset measures whether the
ruling elite represent the ethnic majority, ethnic minority, or whether ethnicity was not salient
among the population. If the ethnic character of the ruling elite changed, the case was coded as
having had a shift in ethnic status. The measure was used to test whether regular leaders have
fewer ethnic power shifts, and whether these shifts contribute to the effects of leadership
regularity.
V4: Majority Representation
The effects of ethnic power shifts must be compared to the effects of representing the
majority of the population in order to determine whether representing the elite is really more
important than representing the majority. On the one hand, it is possible that a large support base
could serve to marginalize the elites. Furthermore, a ruler's power largely depends upon their
ability to extract resources from the population, and insofar as achieving aims depends upon the
cooperation of the population, representativeness is likely to be important. The more
representative a government, the smaller the pool of potential opponents becomes. On the other
hand, elites are likely to resist losses to power, are likely to control access to resources, and may
even control means of mobilizing opposition to the government. Harf and Gurr's measure of the
ethnic character of the elite was used to indicate leaders who represent the ethnic majority,
leaders who represent the ethnic minority, and cases in which ethnicity was not salient.
V5: Ethnic Fractionalization
Ethnic divisions can be volatile, leading to civil violence and conflict. This is especially
the case when representatives from ethnic groups are excluded from governance (Cederman,
Wimmer, & Min, 2010). The cognitive principles favoring regular leaders are especially
important in the case of ethnic conflict. A division along clear ethnic lines makes social-group
identity all the more salient. Because of its salience, status reversals are more likely to be viewed
in social-group terms and biases are likely to be enhanced. Ethnic divisions contribute to social
identity with more salience than other divisions because they cannot be changed. Because they
are so intrinsically linked, ethnic divisions serve as grounds by which to unify for rebellion.
Because ethnicity can be used to define a person, it becomes more difficult for ethnic members
of the old leader to remain in the government after a power transition, resulting in a brain drain
and loss of experience and capacity. The irregular leader would have to focus on rebuilding lost
capacity where an old leader would not. This predicts that ethnic divisions strengthen the effects
of irregular leadership transition.
Fearon and Laitin find that ethnic divisions do not matter when other factors are
controlled for (2003), however, the many sound theoretical claims surrounding ethnic divisions
have been made 5 . Ethnic divisions can tend to have higher stakes, raising the barrier to non-
participation in violent conflict. Furthermore, other studies have found that ethnic divisions do
prolong conflict (De Rouen Jr., 2004). Although their importance is contentious, they are still
worth further investigation.
An indicator of ethnic fractionalization was taken from the PITF database of commonly
used variables. The indicator is the probability that two randomly drawn citizens of a state will
be from the different ethnic groups.
V6: Ethnic War
Simple ethnic diversity could signify a more egalitarian society where ethnicity is less
salient, but could signify more violence in a state where ethnicity is more salient. Donald
Horowitz finds that ethnic divisions are important where they are salient, but a simple measure of
ethnic fractionlization does not indicate salience. However, a measure of whether parties to civil
conflict are drawn on ethnic lines does. The PITF state failure problem set contains an indicator
of ethnic conflict. This allows for separate analysis of pure ethnic diversity, and of salient ethnic
divisions between violently conflicting groups. Considering the contention surrounding the role
of ethnicity in civil conflict, both measures are necessary to understand the nature of role the
ethnic divisions play.
V7: Legitimacy
Downes' theoretical argument about the importance of legitimacy was valid. Old leaders
are the status quo, and as such have a certain degree of legitimacy just by being in power. They
are familiar to the population as a whole and are thus are more likely to gain the trust of the
population than an unfamiliar new leader. Irregular leaders are generally revisionist and have a
15 For example, weak leaders sometimes use ethnic divisions to maintain their power, leading to sustained conflict
(Bienen, 1993). Donald Horowitz provides a review of the importance of and the effects of ethnic divisions in
societies in which these divisions are highly salient (Horowitz, 1985).
higher bar to meet in terms of legitimacy. They must invest effort in proving themselves in order
to prevent opposition, and as such can invest fewer resources into stabilizing the state. Similarly,
a regular leader is more likely to hold power among old power-holders. Having legitimacy
amongst a more powerful group might lead to more substantive support for the leader, which can
help him to regain stability. Legitimacy was not measured empirically, so whether regular
leaders really have greater legitimacy was not tested. However, the role of legitimacy and how it
is used by irregular leaders was observed in the illustrative case. It is therefore necessary to
carefully describe what counts as legitimacy.
There are many different approaches to defining legitimacy. Weber gives a somewhat
abstract definition focusing on citizens' beliefs. He suggests that a government is legitimate
when its citizens orient their actions in accordance with the belief that it is legitimate. For
example, a thief believes in the legitimacy of the state if he hides his actions because he believes
that disobeying the law is wrong. The thief does not believe in the legitimacy of the state if he
only hides his actions in order to avoid punishment. Fritz Scharpf measures legitimacy by
looking at actions rather than beliefs (Scharpf, 2007). He says that "the function of legitimacy is
to ensure voluntary compliance with unwelcome enterprise of governing authority." Like Weber,
he does not believe that fear of violence can contribute to legitimacy. Margaret Levi & Audrey
Sacks' definition differs slightly in that they allow fear of retribution to contribute to legitimacy
(Levi & Sacks, 2006). They describe legitimacy as when citizens act with semi-voluntary
compliance, meaning that they are willing to follow unwanted government edicts that are backed
by coercion. Some scholars also use measures of state efficacy and accountability to measure
legitimacy (Levi & Sacks, 2006; Weatherford, 1992).
Weber and Scharpf's definitions most closely capture the concept of legitimacy used
here. Measures using capability and accountability are flawed because it is possible for a non-
responsive or ineffectual leader to have legitimacy, as long as the population supports his right to
rule. Observations of capability and accountability are also less useful when observing failed
states. It is also important to distinguish between legitimacy and coercion. In order to be
legitimate, the citizens of a state that relies on enforcing compliance through a strong coercive
apparatus would have to believe that the strongest actor has the right to rule. The leader would
only be legitimate if society viewed his use of force as a legitimating factor. Citizens must
believe that their ruler has the right to rule, and believe that it is right to follow his laws and
dictates.
Special focus was paid to charismatic legitimacy because it endows leaders with special
privileges that help them to gain support and consolidate control. Rather than relying on
reinforcement mechanisms to promote rule of law, charismatic leaders effectively transform self
interest to collective interest and inspire collective action and even devotion toward the leader's
goals. Instead of appealing to rationality, they effect emotional attachments by creating a
common identity and highlighting the importance of duty (Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993). As a
result, they are especially adept at unifying a population. However, because the state apparatus
depends upon a single personality, when the leader dies, or is removed, the government is subject
to collapse. In order for a state to remain stable after the removal of a charismatic leader, it must
routinize and become either a traditional or rational state. Nonetheless, charisma can help a new
leader to rally support for the government and unify a population against opposition, thereby
helping a leader to reconsolidate power.
Along with variables used to test the validity of the theoretical underpinnings of the
effects of leadership transition regularity, several other important controls were derived from the
literature on conflict termination. They are not predicted to interact with the explanatory
variable, but must be controlled for because it cannot be assumed that they are evenly distributed
between irregular and regular cases of failure.
Greater levels of current violence
Higher casualties in a conflict create a higher perceived cost for not participating in
violence if a threat arises, leading to an increase in propensity for renewed conflict (Hartzell &
Hoddie, 2003). Furthermore, whatever grievance that is causing the violence is probably more
severe if there is more severe violence. Because humans are risk and loss averse, they will prefer
to continue fighting rather than risk complete loss if levels of violence are high. This holds true
for both sides-it should not matter whether there is an old or irregular leader in power.
However, it is also possible that violence is not evenly distributed between groups. More violent
conflicts may be more likely to induce irregular leadership change. If this were the case,
prolonged failure could be the result of more intense conflicts, not of the irregular leader.
Controlling for the intensity of the conflict eliminate this potential bias.
Intensity of violence was taken from the magnitude of failure score from the PITF State
Failure Problem Set because it represents the number of conflict related deaths.
Hard power
The importance of hard power is straightforward: if a state is more capable of exerting
force, it is more likely to be able to regain a monopoly over legitimate force, extract resources,
and regain stability. It does not matter whether the irregular or regular leader has this capacity.
For example, if an irregular leader comes to power through a military coup, then they are no less
likely to be able to wield hard power than a given regular leader.
It is not entirely clear that how important hard power is. On the one hand, randomized
violence has been suggested to be effective in reducing conflict, (Lyall, 2009). On the other
hand, the success of insurgencies and terrorist organizations shows that overwhelming
conventional military power might not be enough to deter civil conflict. After all, Soviet
occupation, for example, was violently opposed in many states, despite their overwhelming
power capabilities. Still, because state power plays so strongly into any analysis measuring the
cost of engaging in civil conflict, it must be controlled for.
Two indicators were used to measure hard power: military spending per capita and the
percentage of the labor force enrolled as military personnel. Neither measure is perfect, but
together they represent two facets of hard power. Spending indicates how well funded the
military is, which relates to its capability. This measure is flawed because different amounts of
spending can buy different amounts of force in different locations. Deploying an American
soldier for a year costs roughly one million US dollars. Deploying a soldier within a failed state
is likely to cost considerably less. The percentage of participation in the military hints at its
legitimacy, professionalism, and size relative to the population. Percentage of military personnel
is also an effective measure because an effective counterinsurgency strategy depends largely on a
large number of personnel relative to the population.
Population and GDP were also controlled for in order to ensure that like countries were
being compared. Countries with higher GDP are likely to have more capacity and greater ease of
recovery and small countries might behave differently from large countries in many ways.
Data Limitations
No matter how many controls are used, there are certain limitations inherent to the study.
State failure is highly overdetermined. No single factor can ever account for all variation in
failure duration, nor can any variable ever be truly independent, and leadership regularity is no
exception. While the theory section articulated a causal story predicting the effects of leadership
regularity, there is no way to truly determine how much of any variation predicted by leadership
variation is due to those factors which are caused by the leadership variation, and which are
caused by correlated factors. For example, it is entirely possible that states with Regular leaders
have shorter durations not because states in which Irregular transitions occurred were overall
weaker. In the Regular group, leaders were strong enough to hold on to power, which could
mean that the states were stronger, and better equipped to recover from failure. Endogeneity
issues are certain to play a role in the predicted effects of irregular transitions, but there is no
way to tell how much of a role they play relative to the effects of the variable. One must be very
cautious, therefore, when drawing inferences from the findings of the quantitative analysis.
There is no way to be confident that the effects of leadership regularity are causal. Rather, any
effects should be viewed as predictive.
Quantitative Analysis
Because this analysis focuses on the effects of irregular leader change, the group in which
no change occurred will serve as the functional control group, while the treatment group will
consist of those cases in which an irregular leadership change occurred. The universe of cases is
all failed states since 1955.
The initial exploration of the effects of irregular leader transitions consisted of a simple
cross tabulation. The mean time until recovery from failure onset in the control group was
compared to the mean time until failure recovery from leadership change in the irregular group.
This is not a fair comparison because the years of failure prior to leadership change are only
excluded in the treatment group, making the treatment duration of failure shorter. However, the
bias is against the direction of the hypothesis, making it an even stronger test: if the control
group has a significantly shorter duration despite the bias in favor of the treatment group, the
results are more robust. To overcome this bias, the mean for the transformed control was also
calculated. In the transformed control, the sum of all truncated years in the irregular group was
subtracted from the sum of all durations in the regular group.
Table 1: Cross tabulations of the mean time until failure
recovery from failure onset in the control group and
irregular leader change in the treatment group.
3.045 0.787 Transformed control had the total number of truncated
years from the treatment group subtracted prior to
averaging. This supports the hypothesis, suggesting that8.573 1.347 irregular leadership change prolongs state failure.
Table 1 and Figure 1 show that the preliminary findings support the hypothesis. Even the
control group durations are significantly shorter than the treatment durations, despite the bias in
favor of the treatment group, suggesting that irregular leader change does predict prolonged
failure.
Using the treated control group, in which the mean length of
Mean Durations
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leader change from the treatment group, a regression analysis was conducted. By using the
treated control, the durations between both groups were comparable. The results are shown in
Figure 2 and Table 2.
SS df MS
5780.33575 99 58.3872298
Number of obs
F( 1, 98)
Prob > F
R- squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
100
14.43
0.0003
0.1283
0.1194
7.1703
TreatedDu-n Coef. Std. Err. t P>It [95% Conf. Interval]
treatment 5.486979 1.444499 3.80 0.000 2.620417 8.35354
_cons 2.521286 .9581723 2.63 0.010 .619824 4.422748
Table 2: The
regression
coefficient is 5.49,
suggesting that an
irregular leader
change predicts a
roughly five and a
half year increase
in failure duration.
Results are
significant beyond
a 95% confidence
interval.
The regression coefficient was 5.49, with greater than 99.9% confidence. This means that
the bivariate model suggests that irregular leadership change predicts that state failure will last
roughly five and a half years longer. The figure shows negative values for the duration of failure
Figure 1: Mean time until
failure recovery for failed
states with regular and
irregular leaders. Duration
is measured from the point
of Irregular transition in the
irregular group and from
failure onset in the Regular
group. The Transformed
Regular group has had the
mean time from failure
onset until transition
subtracted. Error bars show
standard error. Both the
Regular group, and the
transformed Regular group
have shorter durations than
the Irregular group,
supporting the hypothesis.
the time until irregular
. reg TreatedDurationmean treatment
Source
Model 741.834866 1 741.834866
Residual 5038.50088 98 51.4132743
Total
Irregular
for some of the control cases. This is because the control cases were treated by subtracting the
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* change from the treatment cases.
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Figure 2: Bivariate regression of the effect of irregular drto a hfe o0
leadership change on years of failure duration. Irregular Temliait ersinileader change predicts an increase in duration of failure
compared to leader change. Note that the negative
values in the control group exist because mean durationsshwinTbe3Cotligfr
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V2:Bueaucr ticSrengeth
Fgu e ivriatr s   reaucrt  feth eiregua tt u ation w s s i ted t  0.
leadersipn. cane n ers ofe fre .datin Irregular g The multivariate regression is
valus i th cotro ru  is au  e r shown in Table 3. Controlling for
from the treatment group were subtracted.
other factors only reduced the
coefficient to 5.11, with 99.7% confidence. This means irregular leadership change predicts a
roughly five year increase in failure duration, but which variables associated with leadership
regularity explain this effect?
V2: Bureaucratic Strength
The distribution of bureaucratic strength between the two groups was measured using a
regression. Table 4 reports the results. Cases in the Irregular group had leaders who were roughly
10%, with 94.2% confidence, less constrained by their bureaucracy, suggesting that Irregular
leaders do tend to have lower bureaucratic strength.
. reg TreatedDurationmean treatment Cont*
Source ss df MS
Model 946.102244 6 157.683707
Residual 4834.2335 93 51.9810054
Total 5780.33575 99 58.3872298
Number of obs = 100
F( 6, 93) = 3.03
Prob > F = 0.0094
R-squared = 0.1637
Adj R-squared = 0.1097
Root MSE = 7.2098
TreatedDu-n Coef. Std. Err. t P>It| [95% Conf. Interval]
treatment 5.108265 1.647487 3.10 0.003 1.836683 8.379848
Contpop 5.51e-09 4.36e-09 1.26 0.210 -3.16e-09 1.42e-08
Cont_gdp .7819178 1.059213 0.74 0.462 -1.32147 2.885306
Contmag 1.075019 .7926232 1.36 0.178 -.4989735 2.649012
Cont milex -5.77e-08 7.69e-08 -0.75 0.455 -2.11e-07 9.50e-08
Contmilper -61.87061 98.17078 -0.63 0.530 -256.8183 133.0771
_cons -6.230494 8.274707 -0.75 0.453 -22.66242 10.20143
reg V2 treatment
Table 3:
Multivariate
regression
analysis. The
regression
coefficient is
5.11, suggesting
that irregular
leadership
transitions
predict a roughly
five year
increase in
failure duration.
Table 4:
Source ss df Ms Number of obs = 100 Distribution of
Model 12.3608581 1 12.3608581 F( 1 9 = .01 political
Residual 402.283437 98 4.10493303 R-squared = 0.0298
Adj R-squared = 0.0199 between
Total 414.644295 99 4.18832621 Root MSE = 2.0261 treatment and
control groups.
V2 Coef. Std. Err. t P>ItI [95% Conf. Interval] Results showa
treatment - .7082783 .4081621 -1.74 0.086 1.518263 .1017061 confience
-cons 2.941513 .2707441 10.86 0.000 2.40423 3.478796 suggietngcha
irregular leaders
are 10.1% more constrained,
and thus have weaker
bureaucracies.
To determine how much of the variation of bureaucratic strength between the two groups
is due to leadership regularity, and how much is due to endogenous control factors, a
multivariate regression was conducted. The results are reported in Table 5. Once the controls
were used, all statistical significance dropped, suggesting that while bureaucratic strength is
associated with leadership regularity, the weaker bureaucracies in the Irregular group were not
weaker because of the leader's irregular ascension. It is likely that states with weak
bureaucracies were more likely to suffer irregular leadership change, for whatever reason.
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Although leadership regularity does not explain variation in bureaucratic strength, it does predict
it, suggesting irregular leadership acts as a good proxy.
SS df MS
24.64 99 .248888889
Number of obs = 100
F( 6, 93) = 4.55
Prob > F = 0.0004
R-squared = 0.2270
Adj R-squared = 0.1771
Root MSE = . 45255
treatment Coef. Std. Err. t P>ItI [95% Conf. Interval]
V2 -.0171113 .0238975 -0.72 0.476 -.0645669 .0303444
Contpop -5.18e-10 2.75e-10 -1.88 0.063 -1.06e-09 2.88e-11
Contgdp -.0838447 .0685232 -1.22 0.224 -.2199182 .0522288
Contmag .1786439 .046191 3.87 0.000 .0869177 .27037
Cont milex -3.59e-09 4.82e-09 -0.74 0.459 -1.32e-08 5.9ge-09
Cont milper -5.124828 6.230746 -0.82 0.413 -17.49785 7.248198
cons .6700559 .5191781 1.29 0.200 -.3609289 1.701041
Table 5:
Multivariate
Regression on the
distribution of
bureaucratic
strength between
treatment groups.
Statistical
significance was
not reached,
suggesting that
leadership
regularity does not
cause, but does
predict variation in
bureaucratic
strength.
V3: Ethnic Power Shift
The distribution of ethnic status reversals between the treatment groups was measured
using a bivariate regression. Results are reported in Table 6. Irregular cases were 29.5%, with
97% confidence, more likely to have ethnic reversals of power. Table 7 shows the results of a
multivariate regression. Confidence was reduced to 90.9%, which means that the variation of
ethnic status reversals cannot be confidently attributed to the leadership regularity.
SS df MS
24.64 99 .248888889
Number of obs
F( 1, 98)
Prob > F
R- squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
100
4.87
0.0296
0.0474
0.0376
.48941
Table 6:
Bivariate
Regression
Analysis.
Irregular cases
were 29.5%
more likely to
have ethnic
power reversals.
. reg treatment V2 Cont*
Source
Model 5.59359216 6 .932265361
Residual 19.0464078 93 .204800084
Total
reg treatment V3
Source
Model 1.16678571 1 1.16678571
Residual 23.4732143 98 .239522595
Total
treatment Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf . Interval]
V3 .2946429 .1334976 2.21 0.030 .0297211 .5595646
cons .3928571 .0533991 7.36 0.000 .2868884 .4988258
V3 Cont*
SS df MS
Model 6.07205638 6 1.0120094
Residual 18.5679436 93 .199655308
Total 24.64 99 .248888889
Number of obs
F( 6, 93)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
100
5.07
0.0002
0.2464
0.1978
.44683
treatment Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
V3 .2144471 .125445 1.71 0.091 - .0346618 .463556
Cont pop -6.05e-10 2.65e-10 -2.28 0.025 -1.13e-09 -7.78e-11
Contgdp -.0875325 .0651567 -1.34 0.182 -.2169207 .0418557
Contmag .1681348 .0461064 3.65 0.000 .0765768 .2596929
Contmilex -2.96e-09 4.76e-09 -0.62 0.536 -1.24e-08 6.50e-09
Cont-milper -3.832721 6.076339 -0.63 0.530 -15.89913 8.233683
-cons .644997 .5095133 1.27 0.209 -.3667955 1.65679
reg treatment
Source
V4: Majority Representation
The importance of majority representation can be compared to the importance of ethnic
power shifts. Table 8 shows the results of a bivariate regression investigating the distribution of
majority representation. There is no statistically significant difference between the amount of
majority representation between the two groups.
reg treatment V4 Table 8: Bivariate
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 100 regression
F( 1, 98) = 1.57 analysis analyzing
Model .387542129 1 .387542129 Prob > F = 0.2138 the distribution of
Residual 24.2524579 98 .24747406 R-squared = 0.0157 majority
Adj R-squared = 0.0057
Total 24.64 99 .248888889 Root MSE = .49747 representation
between treatment
treatment Coef. Std. Err. t P>It| [95% Conf. Interval] groups. There was
no significant
V4 - . 091881 .0734228 -1.25 0.214 - .2375863 .0538242 difference
_cons .5292097 .0869295 6.09 0.000 .3567009 .7017185 between groups.
The relative effects of majority representation on failure duration were compared to the
effects of ethnic shifts in status. Table 9 shows that ethnic reversals do explain more of the
variance. The measure of ethnic power shifts reached 99.8% confidence, while the measure of
ethnic representation did not reach significance.
Table 7:
Multivariate
regression Analysis
measuring the
distribution of
ethnic power shifts
between treatment
groups. Statistical
significance
dropped to .091,
suggesting ethnic
power reversals are
represented by, but
not necessarily
caused by irregular
leaders
SS df MS
5780.33575 99 58.3872298
Number of obs =
F( 8, 91) =
Prob>F =
R-squared =
Adj R-squared =
Root MSE =
100
3.85
0.0006
0.2529
0.1872
6.8888
TreatedDu-n Coef. Std. Err. t P>jtj [95% Conf. Interval]
treatment 3.778053 1.638881 2.31 0.023 .5226175 7.033489
V3 6.421962 2.002001 3.21 0.002 2.445232 10.39869
V4 -1.482422 1.084536 -1.37 0.175 -3.63672 .671876
Contpop 2.56e-09 4.32e-09 0.59 0.556 -6.03e-09 1.11e-08
Cont gdp .6860266 1.036923 0.66 0.510 -1.373694 2.745747
Cont mag .8916177 .7599638 1.17 0.244 - .6179571 2.401192
Contmilex -3.69e-08 7.40e-08 -0.50 0.619 -1.84e-07 1.10e-07
Contmilper -44.50741 93.97468 -0.47 0.637 -231.1766 142.1618
cons -3.939481 8.399913 -0.47 0.640 -20.62488 12.74591
. reg TreatedDurationmean treatment V3 V4 Cont*
with 99.8% confidence
V5: Ethnic Fractionalization and V6: Ethnic War
The distributions of ethnic fractionalization, and of ethnic war between the two treatment
groups were investigated with bivariate regressions. The results in Table 10 and 11 show that
ethnic fractionalization and ethnic war, respectively were evenly distributed between the Regular
and Irregular groups. Neither was a significant predictor of failure recovery time, nor were
interactions with the leadership recovery significant. These findings suggest that ethnic
fractionalization was not a confounding factor.
Source SS df MS
Model .006054504 1 .006054504
Residual 24.6339455 98 .251366791
Total 24.64 99 .248888889
Number of obs
F( 1, 98)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
100
0.02
0. 8770
0.0002
-0.0100
.50136
Table 10: Bivariate
regression
investigating the
distribution of
ethnic
fractionalization
between the two
treatment groups.
Distribution was
found to be equal.
Source
Table 9:
Multivariate
regression
comparing the
effects of
representing the
ethnic majority to
shifts in ethnic
power.
Representing the
majority was not
statistically
significant, but
ethnic power shifts
predicted 6.42 more
years of failure,
Model 1461.85801 8 182.732251
Residual 4318.47774 91 47.4557993
Total
req treatment V5
treatment Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
V5 .0266318 .1715995 0.16 0.877 -.3139017 .3671654
cons . 4269765 . 0977522 4.37 0.000 .2329903 .6209626
reg treatment V6
Source SS df Ms
Model .220645161 1 .220645161
Residual 24.4193548 98 .24917709
Total 24.64 99 .248888889
Number of obs = 100
F( 1, 98) = 0.89
Prob > F = 0.3490
R-squared = 0.0090
Adj R-squared = -0.0012
Root MSE = .49918
treatment Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
V6 - .0967742 .102841 -0.94 0.349 - .3008589 .1073105
-cons .5 .0809771 6.17 0.000 .3393036 .6606964
Table 11: Bivariate
regression
investigating the
distribution of
ethnic war between
treatment groups.
An even
distribution was
found.
Comparison of Variables
The largest imbalances were found for bureaucratic strength and ethnic power shifts. The
relative importance of these variables were contrasted with each other and the control variables.
The results are shown in Table 12. None of the control variables reach statistical significance,
suggesting that they do not predict variation within the dependent variable. Bureaucratic strength
and ethnic power shifts did predict variation. Irregular leadership predicted a 2.75 year increase
in failure duration when there was no bureaucratic strength, or ethnic power shifts. Each point
increase in political constraint predicted a .19 year increase in failure duration, or a 1.35 year
increase when going from no constraint to full constraint. An ethnic power shift predicted a .60
year increase in duration time. Bureaucratic strength therefore represents more of the variation
predicted by leadership regularity than ethnic power reversals. Neither variable represent all of
the variation because the effects of leadership regularity remained significant when they were
controlled for. This makes sense, since only some of the related factors could be measured. It is
puzzling that constraint predicted an increase in failure time. It is possible that having more
constraint in a corrupt environment limited the executive's ability to govern effectively. The
political constraint measure indicated strong bureaucracies, not effective bureaucracies.
. reg TreatedDurationmean treatment V2 V2_int V3 V3_int Cont*
Source ss df MS
Model 4676.98215 10 467.698215
Residual 1103.3536 89 12.3972314
Total 5780.33575 99 58.3872298
Number of obs = 100
F( 10, 89) = 37.73
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.8091
Adj R-squared = 0.7877
Root MSE = 3.521
TreatedDu-n Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
treatment 2.746908 .8265895 3.32 0.001 1.104493 4.389324
V2 - .5780457 .2195203 -2.63 0.010 -1.014228 - .1418635
V2_int .1934546 .0159668 12.12 0.000 .161729 .2251803
V3 -2.372391 1.48008 -1.60 0.113 -5.313279 .5684972
V3_int .595811 .1021577 5.83 0.000 .3928258 .7987962
Cont_pop -1.26e-09 2.22e-09 -0.57 0.572 -5.67e-09 3.15e-09
Contgdp -.501475 .5473803 -0.92 0.362 -1.589108 .586158
Contmag -.1164759 .4019081 -0.29 0.773 -.9150588 .682107
Cont milex 1.03e-08 3.81e-08 0.27 0.788 -6.53e-08 8.59e-08
Contmilper 13.76087 48.76087 0.28 0.778 -83.12594 110.6477
cons 5.708234 4.245087 1.34 0.182 -2.726664 14.14313
Table 12:
Multivariate
regression analysis
investigating the
relative effect size
of executive
constraint (V2) and
ethnic power shifts
(V3). V2 is
measured out of 7,
and has a stronger
effect.
Alternative Quantitative Methodology
Subtracting the mean time-until-irregular-change is a good first attempt to make the
control and treatment groups comparable, but it is only appropriate if the distribution of times
until irregular change are centered around the mean. If they are not, using the mean will generate
a bias in the opposite direction to the direction that the times are skewed. If they are right
skewed, the mean is a low estimate of the amount that should be subtracted. If they are left
skewed, the mean is a high estimate. Figure 3 shows that the distribution of times is better
represented by an exponentially decaying, or a poisson model. Postestimation suggests that it is
well represented by a poisson distribution with lamda = 1.57, with a confidence interval greater
than 99.9%. A multivariate regression in which the Regular group was treated by subtracting
randomly generated onset times from a poisson distribution with lamda = 1.57 and mean 4.568
shows the results remain significant, with a regression coefficient of 4.77 and confidence of .993,
as shown in Table 13.
Figure 3: Histogram of the
distribution of years prior
to irregular transition of
leader. These are
approximated by poisson
distribution with
lamda=1.57, but are right
skewed, making a simple
poisson distribution
inappropriate
SS df MS
6115.01909 99 61.7678696
Number of obs
F( 6, 93)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
100
2.42
0.0321
0.1352
10.0794
7. 5409
FreatedDu-s Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
treatment 4.773133 1.723142 2.77 0.007 1.351314 8.194952
Contpop 3.47e-09 4.56e-09 0.76 0.449 -5.59e-09 1.25e-08
Contgdp .2943627 1.107854 0.27 0.791 -1.905616 2.494341
Cont mag 1.013205 .8290217 1.22 0.225 -.6330675 2.659478
Cont milex -3.29e-08 8.05e-08 -0.41 0.683 -1.93e-07 1.27e-07
Contmilper -53.82132 102.6789 -0.52 0.601 -257.7213 150.0787
_cons -2.087091 8.654694 -0.24 0.810 -19.2736 15.09942
Table 13:
Multivariate
analysis in which
the Regular
group was
treated using a
with Poisson
distribution.
Results remained
significant and
suggest that
irregular
leadership
predicts a
roughly 5 year
increase in
failure duration.
Despite the goodness of fit of a Poisson distribution, no parametric model can adequately
represent the data. The poisson distribution in the Irregular group is right skewed; when
lamda= 1.57, the probability of a time longer than ten years is virtually zero, yet the actual
. reg TreatedDurationpois treatment Cont*
Source
Model 826.600089 6 137.766681
Residual 5288.419 93 56.8647204
Total
distribution contains many cases in which the duration is longer than zero. Because the poisson
distribution fails to adequately represent the distribution, a non-parametric approach is
appropriate.
A non-parametric method requires taking onset times from the Irregular group and
subtracting them from the Regular group. To do this, a yoked control design was used. Each case
from the control group was paired with a randomly drawn case from the treatment group. The
time prior to irregular change was then subtracted from the control case. This was done using
bootstrapping.
Bootstrapping is a Bayesian technique that attempts to draw inferences about a
population parameter from limited sample data. By making the assumption that the cases within
the sample represent the overall distribution of the population, it attempts to overcome variations
in the sample by randomly drawing new sample sets from the data given. In experiments, this is
equivalent to rerunning the experiment several times and creating a histogram to calculate the
confidence intervals. In non-experimental studies, it takes random variation into account,
determining whether, if things happened to have occurred slightly differently, if the same result
would have been obtained. The key difference between Bayesian estimations and traditional
likelihood estimations is that a likelihood estimate determines the percentage of the time, (95%
for scientific significance,) that the true parameter will fall within the sample confidence interval,
while the Bayesian estimation gives a confidence interval in which the sample parameter will fall
95% of the time. This distinction is especially important when limited data makes it difficult to
use distinct samples to develop and test a model because it reduces the potential for over-fitting.
In the present study, 1000 iterations of the 56 regular cases each were drawn. In each
iteration, each control case was randomly paired with an irregular case from which the time-prior
to irregular leader change was taken and subtracted from the total failure duration of that regular
case. Figure 4 shows that the randomly drawn values represent a similar distribution to the values
from the irregular group. After each iteration, a regression analysis was conducted, the
coefficients from which were averaged to determine the coefficient estimates shown in Table 14.
The regression coefficient was reduced to 4.72, meaning that irregular leaders predict nearly five
years of prolonged conflict.
Figure 4: As
predicted, the
distribution of
randomly drawn
truncation times
for the Regular
Group closely
match the
truncation times
shown in Figure
3.
Table 14: Regression
coefficients from the
Bayesian regression
analysis in which the
regular leader group was
truncated using non-
parametric
bootstrapping.
The coefficient was
reduced to 4.72, but
remained above a 95%
confidence interval.
Figure 4:
Multivariate
Regression analysis
of bootstrap-treated
data. Suggests that
irregular leadership
change predicts
prolonged failure.
In addition to regression analyses, a survival analysis was performed using the cox
proportional hazard model. The benefit to a survival analysis is that it allows comparison among
Variable Regression 95% Confidence 95% Confidence
Coefficient Interval, Lower Interval, Upper
bound Bound
Leadership 4.72 1.06 8.37
Regularity
Population 0.00 0 0
GDP 0.05 -0.63 0.72
Magnitude 0.93 -0.79 2.65
Military 0.00 0 0
Expenditure
Military -40.65 -251.54 170.25
Personnel
the strongest cases and among the weakest cases, allowing for variation within a group. It is
more appropriate than a regression analysis for Bernoulli variables such as whether or not
irregular leader change occurred. In a scatterplot, a line of points exists over each value. In a
survival function, each of those lines is viewed along an axis such that similar cases can be
compared, and the overall shape of the distribution can be observed.
The cox proportional hazard model requires there to be no missing data. Because data is
collapsed by case, data missing from specific years was not problematic because it was collapsed
across years. However, certain cases had extensive missing data and were not used. From the
treatment group, only Iraq 2003 was excluded. From the control group, Djibouti 1991-1994,
Ethiopia 1999-2000, Pakistan 2004, Rwanda 2001, Turkey 2004, Thailand 2004, the UK 1971-
1982, Yemen 2004, Yemen 1994, and Yugoslavia 1998-1999. The majority of these cases did
not have data because they were too recent.
Figure 5 shows the empirical cumulative distribution function (eCDF) of the
bootstrapped data, accounting for censoring, and Figure 6 shows it's derivative, the probability
distribution. The eCDF and probability distribution show any patterns the data might contain.
The eCDF is equal to 1- S(t), or one minus the survival function. It shows the probability that a
state has recovered from failure at time t. Figure 5 shows that for nearly all time points, the
probability of Irregular cases having recovered is lower than the probability of Regular cases
having recovered. It predicts that at a given time after leader change, states experiencing leader
change are more likely to have recovered.
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Figure 5:
Bivariate
Empirical
Cumulative
Distribution
Function of the
control and
treatment groups
after
bootstrapping.
0
00O000
* Irregular Group
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Figure 6: Failure Durations in Regular and Irregular groups. Failure durations are on the whole
shorter in the Regular group.
The cox proportional hazard model allowed a multivariate analysis of the survival
function. The survival function relates to the eCDF as:
F(t) = 1-S(t)
and represents the percentage of states still in the dataset, or states that have yet to recover, over
time. The survival function can be calculated from the cumulative baseline hazard function,
which represents the cumulative relative risk at of failure at each time point, conditional upon
survival until that time point. It relates to survival function as
H(t) = -log(S(t)).
The baseline cumulative hazard function can be calculated from empirical data with the cox
proportional hazard model. The model is ideal because it integrates out the baseline hazard,
meaning that-unlike other survival models such as Weibull-it does not constrain the data with
pre-estimated parameters. Instead, it is used to calculate the effects of the control variables
without specifying a functional form. The results of the Hazard model are shown in Figure 7.
Like in the eCDF, the probability of recovery was higher in states that had not experienced an
irregular transition at for every possible duration.
H d Fvnction Figure 7:
Multivariate
Hazard
Model. For
all failure
durations,
regular
leaders have
a higher
probability
of recovery.
The hazard coefficient from the multivariate hazard analysis was -.3369. Confidence was
reduced to just shy of significance, at 94%, suggesting an extremely strong trend. A coefficient
of -.3369 means a .3369 reduction in the hazard rate, which is the rate of failure recovery. This
means that the rate of failure recovery is roughly thirty four percent greater.
The hypothesis was supported by most of the statistical measures, and the only measure
in which it was not supported reached 94% confidence, suggesting that irregular leadership
transitions do predict increased failure durations. However, the quantitative analysis suffers from
considerable selection effects. Irregular leadership change is non-random: something about the
states that selected into the treatment case caused them to be there. For example, in the control
case, if the leader withstood challenges to their power, they must have been more capable in
some way in order to do so. If they did not face challenges, then they are also inherently different
from treatment cases where there was a challenger strong enough to succeed. There is no way to
know how long treatment group failure would have endured if not for leader change.
The discrepancy in state strength was partly accounted for by conditioning on failure:
states undergoing failure are already suffering conflict and are thus more comparable than a
universe of all states. Furthermore, controlling for magnitude of failure and overall duration
helps to compare cases with similar situations. The intuition behind the selection effects can also
be counterbalanced with an opposing intuition: that any leader that has led a state to failure is
inadequate, but that every leader change is an attempt at getting it right.
Selection effect can never be fully overcome and the model can never prove causal
direction. The theory must also be tested and analyzed in greater detail through the use of a case
study. The following section uses the succession of leaders through the Afghan Civil War as
illustrative examples.
The Afghan Civil War
The Afghan civil war provides an excellent case study for leadership and state failure.
There can be no argument that Afghanistan was a failed state by 1978, by even the most
restrictive definition. It suffered a very protracted civil conflict, governance was not extended
throughout the territory, and the government held no monopoly over the use of legitimate
violence. In fact, the government probably held less legitimacy over the use of violence than
much of the resistance. From the moment the soviets made inroads into the country, the
mujahidin opposition had legitimacy. The communist leaders failed to consolidate control, and
using the above definition of a failed coercive state, Afghanistan failed.
The Afghan case provides a clear example of the difficulties faced by irregular leaders as
they attempt to consolidate control over a territory. The new communist leaders lacked the
informal personal connections that the old leadership had cultivated with the tribal groups, had a
neutered bureaucracy as experienced bureaucrats and technocrats either left or were forced out,
challenged the status of the ethnic and religious elite, were unfamiliar and attempted to institute
policies that were unfamiliar to the majority of the country, lacked traditional legitimacy because
they were not only irregular but attempted to institute an entirely new regime, lacked rational
legitimacy because they failed to address the needs of the people, lacked legitimacy because of
their soviet backing, and failed to develop a charismatic persona.
The failure of the communist regime can be contrasted to the relative successes and
failures of the Mujahidin, and later the Taliban. Different ethnic groups occupied different
regions. During the civil war, Mujahidin commanders took control of various territories. Some of
these commanders were able to extend control and consolidate power within their region,
creating a monopoly over legitimate violence within a territory that they were able to hold. In
some regions, the leaders even extended governance throughout their territory, and were able to
provide resources and services. In others, the predominant leader was less successful at creating
a state-like territory. Because of the relative similarity between the regions, the successful and
unsuccessful commanders can be compared, and the importance of the different variables
contributing to the effects of leadership regularity can be assessed. How did they consolidate
control within their regions, why were they unable to extend this control beyond their regions,
and how did the Taliban succeed as irregular leaders where others failed? Each leader faced
similar challenges and had similar resources, but each had a different approach in their attempt to
consolidate power. Each leader was irregular, and only the Taliban succeeded in consolidating
control over the country. Those with more success than others were hindered because they were
irregular and lacked the benefits that a regular leader might have had. However, they each had
different levels of success because they each attempted to gain access to the assets of regularity
in different ways. By comparing the successes and failures of each major party commander both
within their areas of influence and in the country at large, it is possible to illustrate the roles of
the factors related to leadership regularity. A summary of how each leader addressed these
factors is found in Appendix C.
The dice are stacked against irregular leaders because they must exert influence rather
than merely maintain it. They must be exceptional in some way in order to consolidate control
and help a state to recovery from failure. They can do this by utilizing old structural institutions
and bureaucracy, by being representative of the elite, by having a strong and well recognized
claim on legitimacy, or by being particularly charismatic. Different Afghan warlords were able
to use different strategies to consolidate power within their region of influence, but were unable
to use these strategies effectively in other regions. The Taliban, on the other hand, eventually
emerged and were able to first spread their power through the south, and then to project power
into other regions eventually controlling the majority of the country.
Before beginning any discussion on the Afghan Mujahed commanders, a disclaimer must
be made. I in no way intend to glorify any of these men. They all committed terrible atrocities
and contributed to the destruction of the country. Not one was innocent. When I speak of their
successes or of positive attributes, know that I have not forgotten the negative, and I mean no
disrespect to those who have lost their lives and livelihoods because of the violence they
perpetrated.
Fall to Failure
Prior to 1973, Afghanistan was a constitutional monarchy under King Muhammad Zahir
Shah. The state was highly decentralized. The state controlled the cities and lines of
communication, but extended governance throughout the rural areas, where roughly 85% of the
population resided, through personal alliances with tribes and local leaders. Tax collection was
minimal, and tax rates were negotiated through personal agreements with these local leaders. The
state, therefore, has a highly decentralized and informal infrastructure, depending on the king and
his bureaucracy.
As a hereditary ruler, the king had traditional legitimacy, which he could confer upon his
elected prime ministers. Being a Sunni Muslim gave him legitimacy among the majority of the
population's religious leaders, and as a Durrani Pashtun, he represented the ethnic elite as well as
the slight ethnic majority.
King Zahir Shah, along with his Prime Minister, Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan
(Daoud), hoped to modernize the state in order to reduce tribal power and protect the country
against Pakistan's rise. Zahir Shah courted the US in hopes of receiving defense funding but was
refused because of the burgeoning relationship between the US, and Iran and Pakistan. A
stronger Afghan state would have been seen as a threat to both of those countries, and would not
have benefited the US, where it was believed that no amount of strengthening of the military
would protect against a Soviet invasion (Wafadar K. , 1981). Heartened by Khrushchev's
peaceful coexistence policy, Daoud turned to the USSR for support instead. As a result, the
Afghan Army was primarily funded and trained by the Soviets. The Americans wanted to avoid
shifting the balance of power in Asia and did not wish to give Afghanistan up to Soviet
influence. Instead of providing defense funding, they invested in development projects in the
South, focusing on the Helmand area.
In 1963, the King introduced a new constitution in a push for a more democratic
constitutional monarchy. Daoud was targeted in the constitution, which contained a provision
preventing any members of the royal family from running for Prime Minister. Daoud stepped
down, and a series of less effectual, rapidly alternating Prime Ministers replaced him until 1973,
when he deposed King Zahir Shah in a bloodless coup while he was in Rome seeking medical
16treatment . Daoud proclaimed a Republic, though his government was somewhat more
authoritarian than the monarchy had been.
The transition was relatively smooth, and although it technically constituted a regime
change and an irregular leader transition, it lacked many of the trappings of an irregular change.
Daoud was returning to an executive position that he had inhabited before, and for the most part,
was able to continue on as he had before he had been removed. The transition did not result in
any tumultuous changes domestically or internationally. Although his rise went against the
formal written constitution, it was not seen as a significant change in the eyes of many Afghans.
He was a member of the royal family, and though he chose not to use the title, was technically a
16 The ways he addressed the obstacles associated with leadership irregularity are summarized in Appendix C.
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Prince. He was the king's cousin through marriage, the nephew of the first two prime ministers,
and held office as the third prime minister. In the eyes of much of the population, he was just
another Durrani Muhammadzai successor, and one whose authoritarianism was more promising
than the previous monarch's".
Only eight were killed during the coup. All but two members of the royal family were
allowed to leave, one remained by choice, and none were harmed. Only one major political
opponent, the former Prime Minister Mohammad Hashem Maiwandwal, was killed after an
attempted countercoup, and his death was probably an accident. He had been imprisoned, and
likely tortured, but it is unlikely that Daoud had intended his execution. Because of his
popularity, his death created negative press that Daoud would have wished to avoid. The
bureaucracy from the previous regime was therefore mostly retained.
The little opposition Daoud did face was present prior to his ascension. In the weeks
leading up to the coup, there was talk of a potential regime change. Many suspected that the
King would be persuaded to step down in favor of his son-in-law, Sardar (Prince) Abdul Wali.
Abdul Wali represented a group of powerful actors who would have risen to power had Daoud
not seized the opportunity first. Abdul Wali represented Daud's main opposition, and was
therefore the only member of the royal family to be imprisoned and who was prevented from
leaving the country. However, because this opposition also challenged the King, it was not new
to Daoud's regime and is therefore not a symptom of irregular leadership change.
Daoud's international ties remained primarily the same as the king's. China, for example,
never acknowledged the Coup, aside from a single congratulatory letter. Relations went on
unchanged. The USSR and India were the first to recognize Daoud's new Republic. Daoud was
more adamant about a unified Pashtunistan than his predecessor had been, which was favorable
17 The royal family was Durrani Pashtun, from the Muhammadzai clan.
for India, and thus for its Soviet ally. Both countries looked favorably upon the coup, and
relations were marginally strengthened, but not so strengthened as to be damaging to Daud's
reputation. The US adopted a wait-and-see approach, but relations were not strained. In Iran,
there was concerned over the renewed tensions with Pakistan because the Shah feared a renewal
of conflict in Baluchistan, but he still made attempts to strengthen his relations with Daoud.
Therefore, Afghanistan was no less recognized by the international community, and continued to
receive the same, if not more, aid funding.
Daoud represented the dominant religious and ethnic group, giving him support from
high status the high status group, the elite, and the majority. He strengthened his ties to the
Pashtuns through a strong pro-Pashtun campaign. He very adamantly supported a unified
Pashtunistan, and contested the Durand line. The Durand line, which divided the ethnic Pashtuns
between Afghanistan and Pakistan, was a border agreement drawn up by the British and accepted
by the Pakistanis, but never by the Afghans. Daoud's challenge increased tensions with Pakistan.
In addition to his traditional legitimacy as a member of the royal family, Daoud
attempted to solidify his rational and charismatic legitimacy. He was the charismatic head of the
coup coalition and commanded some popular appeal (Mukerjee, Afghanistan Under Daud:
Relations with Neighboring States, 1975). He also strengthened the drive for modernization. He
viewed the cold war as a short-term opportunity in which the world's two great powers were
willing to engage in development. He hoped to maximize this opportunity to strengthen the
traditionally weak Afghan state, to continue to attempt to extend governance into the rural areas,
and to modernize. So despite being an irregular leader, Daud had personal experience, personal
ties domestically and internationally, continued the development programs of the old leader,
retained the bureaucracy of the old regime, represented the ethnic elite, religious elite, and
political elite, had traditional legitimacy, some charismatic appeal, and began his tenure with
rational legitimacy.
Afghanistan had never had a strong state. Previous monarchs made deals with semi-
autonomous rural leaders, effectively outsourcing governance. Daoud's increasing attempts to
extend state control challenged local authority and generated opposition, even among the
Pashtuns. Furthermore, his attempts at modernization were not always successful, despite
tremendous aid money.
Daoud continued the wildly unsuccessful dam building project that had begun under his
18first tenure as prime minister . The dam project was intended to irrigate the arid areas around
the Helmand river in order to create high yield farmland. The intention was to settle the Pashtun
nomads in order to prevent them from crossing the Pakistani border. More importantly, the new
farmland would be near government infrastructure and would allow the state to tax more
effectively, as well as to extend governance. However, the nomads resented the settlement
attempts because they viewed themselves as freer and better off than the peasants whose land
they passed. This resentment began brewing long before Daoud's presidency, but was heightened
when it became increasingly clear that the dam program would not work.
The dams caused the water table to rise, waterlogging and destroying crops, as well as
collecting salt deposits and making many fields permanently infertile. Deep water reservoirs
cooled the water, destroying orchards and making the land useful only for wheat-but not even
wheat could grow in the damaged farmlands. Even when new breeds of high efficiency wheat
were introduced, yields continued to fall. In 1970, a drought began and by the time Daoud
entered office in 1973, the Helmand river had nearly dried up. As a result, his rational legitimacy
18 See (Cullather, 2002) for an extensive analysis of the effects of the dam projects on Afghan development and
failure.
depended on him being able to fix the problem that he had started during his time as Prime
Minister. He tried to fix it by continuing the dam project. When America threatened to cut off
funding, he begged Henry Kissinger to continue it. The US relented because it feared losing
influence in Afghanistan to the Soviets. Giving up on the dam project would have been viewed
as a tremendous failure. So Daud continued to pour American money into a flawed plan that had
little chance of success.
The USSR was displeased that Daoud courted US aid, and began to exert influence
through the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). However, the influence that the
soviets did exert, both through Daoud and through the PDPA, caused an opposition to begin to
form. The less Daoud bent to Soviet direction, the more they attempted to exert control through
the PDPA, and the more the opposition feared soviet influence.
While the US had a strong presence in the South, the USSR had a presence in the north
and in the non-Pashtun areas where they had ethnic ties. The USSR contained Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan, and had a presence in the Uzbek and Tajik areas to the north and north-east of Kabul.
This was resented by the religious leadership, who feared Soviet atheism. This resentment was
exhibited in one of the coup attempts against Daoud, which was led by two clerics, one from
Herat to the east, and one from the north. These clerics believed, falsely, that Daoud was under
heavy Soviet influence (Mukerjee, 1975).
Opposition to the state was brewing across the country because of fears of Soviet
influence, failed modernization, and attempts to strengthen the central state. The country was
falling into a crisis at about the time that the USSR finally gave up on attempting to influence
Daoud, and sponsored a violent and disruptive coup, resulting in Daoud's death, and the rise of
the PDPA under Nur Muhammad Taraki'9.
Taraki, Amin, and Karmal, PDPA
Three communist factions started to grow in Kabul after the liberalization of politics
under King Zahir Shah's 1963 constitution, though official parties were illegal. Shu-Li Javid was
pro-China, but was put down by Daoud. The other two were Soviet backed. Parcham had greater
support from the Persian speaking Kabul-dwellers and the Hazara's, while Khalq claimed greater
support from the rural Pashtuns, though in reality, neither party had a significant base of support
(Wafadar K. , 1981). Together, the two pro-soviet groups formed the PDPA. As Daoud tried to
balance Soviet influence with support from Iran and the Arab world, the USSR pumped support
into the PDPA in order to pressure Daoud and increase soviet influence. In response, Daoud
attempted to influence PDPA leadership within the government. This alienated the coup coalition
that had brought him to power, and with their support, the PDPA was able to launch a coup with
20Soviet backing
Unlike the coup that brought Daoud to power, the PDPA coup was bloody. Daoud was
killed, and Nur Mohammad Taraki came to power with Babrak Karmal as second in command.
Taraki was a member of the Khalq faction, Karmal was a member of the Parcham faction. But
shortly thereafter, Taraki made a move to sideline the Parchami's. Karmal was sent abroad, and
then dismissed and replaced with Hafizullah Amin.
19 Asian Survey produced an annual report about the civil conflict in Afghanistan, beginning in 1980. The report
described each year's developments in detail, and provides a good brief history of the conflict (Wafadar K. , 1981;
Wafadar K. , 1982; Dupree, 1983; Dupree, 1984; Coldren, 1985). (Coldren, 1986; Dunbar, 1987; Dunbar, 1988;
Cronin, 1989; Eliot, 1990; Eliot, 1991) (Tarzi, 1992; Tarzi, 1993; Rubin, 1994; Khalilzad, 1995; Khalilzad, 1996;
Magnus, 1997) (Magnus, 1998)
20 The ways each subsequent communist leader addressed the obstacles associated with leadership irregularity are
summarized in Appendix C.
The irregular transition that brought the PDPA to power was nothing like the smooth
transition that brought Daoud to power. Daoud was a member of the royal family to whom the
formal and informal assets of old monarchy were transferred. He was able to continue the plan
for reform that had been set before his ascension. Taraki, on the other hand, did not enjoy any of
the same benefits, and his early actions in office distanced him further from the population. The
transition was anything but smooth, and the roughly one hundred thousand man strong army that
Daoud had built up, dissolved after the coup. The bureaucracy and formal institutions that Daud
had been working hard to build lost considerable functionality.
Daoud, a member of the royal family who tried to distance himself from the Soviets,
received opposition because it was feared that he was under too much soviet influence. Taraki,
on the other hand, was a Ghilzai Pashtun instead of a Durrani Pashtun, and was clearly under
direct Soviet influence. He was openly anti-religious, which earned him even more opposition
from the religious elite across rural Afghanistan. As though he was determined to lose support
from all sectors, he also instituted pro-Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluch, and Nuristani legislature, which
would have reduced Pashtun influence in favor of minority groups. He even excluded the Tajiks,
the second largest and most powerful group. The laws was too strongly opposed for to be
implemented, but his attempt to enact them established him as a threat to the status quo. His
support for these minority, low status ethnic groups might have been influenced by their
proximity to the Soviet border. It is possible that he hoped to gain support from the constituency
he saw as most likely to support him, and saw little chance of support from the Pashtuns. But his
policy failed; Taraki did not represent the religious, political, or ethnic elite, or a majority.
Taraki also attempted to institute massive reforms regarding land redistribution, the status
of women, and customary family law. These were met with massive opposition from the rural
religious, village, and tribal leadership because the reforms attempted to change their way of life
and drastically reduce their local autonomy. The land reform was met with hostility, and Taraki
resorted to violence to compensate, losing him any chance of support among the rural base that
his platform had nominally been built on. Meanwhile, armed opposition continued to foment.
The Parchami's resented having been sidelined, so Taraki even lost support within his
own party. When the USSR recommended that Taraki replace Amin with Karmal as second in
command in order to unify the communist supporters, Amin launched a coup and killed Taraki.
The coup took place in September of 1979.
Amin attempted to regain support among the Pashtuns by pursuing a policy of
Pashtunization. He also attempted to improve relations with religious leaders by appealing to
Islam. He attempted to distance himself from the Soviets by appealing to the West. In this way,
he was attempting to gain support among the important sectors that Taraki had neglected. These
attempts were undermined when he resorted to violence. He killed roughly twelve hundred
intellectuals in Kabul who were suspected of opposing him. He was unable to shake his soviet
reputation to gain support among the sectors he courted, but also alienated the USSR, losing him
support across all sectors. The USSR eventually lost patience with Amin and launched an
invasion in December of 1979, putting Karmal in his place.
It was hoped that Karmal would have some support because of how hated Amin had
been, but Karmal had even less legitimacy because rather than merely being influenced by the
Soviets, Karmal had depended upon an actual invasion in order to take power. The Khalqi's felt
betrayed by the soviets for being sidelined in favor of Karmal, which meant that he did not even
enjoy support from the few thousands communist supporters left in Kabul. Some Khalqi's joined
the mujahidin, and fighting in the streets erupted nightly between Khalqi and Parchami partisans.
Karmal further sidelined the Khalqi's by replacing bureaucrats with less experienced
Parchami party-members, especially in the previously Khalqi dominated ministry of interior and
national security police. This hollowed out the bureaucracy, leaving it nonfunctional. Important
positions were filled with young party members rather than with experienced bureaucrats or
technocrats. These party members had little real responsibility, and instead reported directly to
soviet advisors. There was little incentive for them to behave honestly, and many Khalqi's within
the government supported the Mujahadin. The bureaucratic machinery was stilted, and
completely dependent upon the soviets.
Karmal also depended on the Soviets for security. The military still suffered from loss of
cohesion and moral. Desertion was rampant. To attempt to rebuild the military, a draft was
established. The central government only had real influence in Kabul, which meant that the draft
was conducted almost exclusively there. No one wanted to fight for the soviets, but the ever
desperate government passed laws requiring males to serve in the military before they could
complete their education. They resorted to searching homes and marketplaces for able-bodied
males to fight. This lost Karmal even greater support among the intellectual community, who
fled Kabul, and created a brain drain that further exacerbated damage that had been done to the
governing bureaucracy. It also left the military poorly functioning. Desertion and poor
coordination only increased, and like the central government, the military was left open to
mujahidin intelligence and subversion.
Karmal lost additional rational legitimacy when the economy continued to get worse.
Inflation reached 200% in 1980. In that same year, the population in Kabul doubled and
continued to increase as time went on. Government income dropped, causing Karmal to give up
on land reform. Soviet military campaigns bombed villages and destroyed crops and farmland,
which increased urbanization as refugees fled the rural areas, and contributed to a fuel shortage
and famine during the winter. The Mujahidin made matters worse for the government by closing
supply lines. They successfully fended off soviet attacks which reduced the Soviet military's
reputation for invulnerability, and the legitimacy of the armed resistance. As the opposition
gained legitimacy, the central government lost it, and failure was worsened.
Protests erupted in Kabul and other major cities. Many of these protests were put down
forcefully, including one on the part of high school girls, in which hundreds were killed. Karmal
and the Soviets reacted violently to opposition, leveling villages and bombing cities. Refugees
flocked to Kabul and Jalalabad for security while Herat and Kandahar were left with a fraction of
their pre-war populations. Much of Herat was destroyed by bombing in response to a Mujahadin
military victory in which they took control of several outposts. The Mujahadin made advances
on Kabul and successfully attacked the elite neighborhoods. Karmal's inability to prevent the
attacks lost him credibility among the few elite supporters he had left. The violence continued to
escalate, and Karmal continued to lose any chance he had of mass support. He relied on coercion
and failed to build legitimacy.
Karmal did try to regain some legitimacy. He called a series of loya jirgas, or
congressional assemblies, for which villages and tribes were supposed to elect representatives.
The loya jirgas were a failure. Only a fraction of villages-those located along supply lines-
participated, and they did so reluctantly. Once the first assembly convened, it was dominated by
Khalqi and Parchami infighting, resulting in greater violence. He also created a new, nonpartisan
political party in hopes of distancing himself from Soviet communism. The party was supposed
to be a nationalist party for all Afghans, but it received little support and participants were often
assassinated by the Mujahidin. He also attempted to regain some religious legitimacy by making
an effort to appear more publically devout and changing the military insignia to include Islamic
symbols. However, these gestures were all superficial and did little to gain him legitimacy or
support.
Karmal also attempted to gain support among the Hazara's, by appointing a Hazara
leader as prime minister, and by promising them a certain level of autonomy. His attempts to
court the Hazaras largely failed, and only served to emphasize the Pashtun reversal of power.
As an irregular leader, Karmal and his communist predecessors lacked legitimacy and
charismatic appeal, which prevented them from unifying even the country's few communist
supporters. They alienated the base of support which they were meant to represent, as well as the
country's religious, local, and ethnic elite. Rather than unifying their own movement, they
created so much devastation that they further legitimized the Mujahidin, pushing state failure to a
greater extreme. They also neutered the bureaucracy that had been left over from the previous
regime, removing experienced technocrats and bureaucrats in favor of inexperienced partisans.
Their rise disrupted all of Daoud's development projects. They instituted new projects that were
widely opposed and ineffectual. Land and family law reforms alienated the rural and religious
elite that the Afghan government traditionally relied on to enforce governance. While Taraki,
Amin, and then Karmal failed to establish control, Mujahadin power grew and several regional
commanders began to consolidate control within their regions.
Ahmad Shah Massoud, Jamiat-i-Islami
Ahmad Shah Massoud was a regionl commander within Jamiat-e-Islami (Jamiat)21 . He
controlled the northwestern part of the country, surrounding the Panjshir valley. Massoud was a
university student when the soviets began making inroads into Kabul. He joined the youth
branch of Jamiat, where he met Dr. Burhanuddin Rabbani, the leader of the organization.
21 The ways he addressed the obstacles associated with leadership irregularity are summarized in Appendix C.
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Massoud was able to ascend to prominence because he was the right person in the right
place and time. He was involved from the very beginning of the conflict as a member of the
youth movement in Jamiat. When fighting broke out, he started to gain experience and make a
name for himself by traveling around the country to fight with different groups. Massoud
returned to the Panjshir valley where he began recruiting fighters for a small opposition group.
This was hardly unique-hundreds of commanders defended their villages with small bands of
men. These groups worked together against the Soviets. As some commanders gained power
relative to others, either through their reputations or ability to garner weapons and funds, they
were able to collect alliances. Massoud was able to distinguish himself both through his prowess
on the battlefield and his personal charismatic appeal. His personal connection to Rabanni gave
him credibility and access to international funds. He quickly gained a reputation in the Panjshir
valley that drew supporters and external donors, eventually making him one of the most
prominent of the Afghan regional commanders.
Massoud's success in the north arose because he was able to gain access to the assets that
are usually associated with regular leaders-he gained expertise as a military commander
through experience, and developed personal ties throughout the country and internationally, he
had charismatic appeal, he represented the powerful majority in the north, he had legitimacy as a
successful Mujahadin, and he was able to create centralized institutions and a functioning
bureaucracy.
Massoud was a charismatic young leader. Nicknamed the Lion of Panjshir, he had a
reputation for being a successful, brave fighter in the war against the Soviets. He was loved in
the north, and his image can still be seen all over Mazar-e-Sharif and the Panjshiri parts of
Kabul. During the 2010 election, one legislative candidate included photographs of him standing
with Massoud in his campaign materials. Fond remembrances by his followers describe him as
an excellent, practical commander; intelligent, always studying military strategy; honest rather
than big talking; and a very good listener who was always gathering intelligence and council;
and a good Muslim who prayed regularly2 2 . To those who knew him personally, he was soft
spoken, thoughtful, and a good listener. He also made an effort to create a positive image across
Afghanistan and abroad by welcoming every chance to speak to the media. Massoud's charisma
can be contrasted with the comparably successful Gulbuhdin Hekmatyar of Hizb-i-Islami (Hizb),
who was more often described, even by the Pashtun's he represented, as clientalistic and selfish.
Massoud earned legitimacy by earning admiration and respect from the masses and the
elite in the north. He appealed to the warrior culture by exhibiting his skill on the battlefield,
while appealing to the religious masses by giving the impression of being pious. This was a key
combination necessary for any Afghan leader to gain legitimacy; by being a successful warrior,
he earned respect and proved that he was willing to fight for his country. By being a good
Muslim, he proved his moral superiority and become a moral authority in the eyes of the
Afghans, thereby allowing him to excuse violent actions that would otherwise reflect poorly.
Massoud was able to use personal connections and ties to create a reputation and attain
allies and supporters. He came from an affluent family in the Panjshir valley, giving him some
level of renown from the beginning. He met Rabbani while attending university in Kabul, and
though he was not directed by Jamiat, he remained nominally a Jamiat commander and was able
to receive funds and alliances through Jamiat. In the time between when President Daoud
overthrew the king, and when Massoud became a commander, he traveled and participated in
resistance activity throughout Afghanistan and in Peshawar, making himself familiar. By making
22 This impression was derived from personal interviews his casual supporters as well as one of his executive civil
advisors
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himself known and expanding his reputation he was able to overcome some of the bias against
unknown actors. He organized a resistance group in Panjshir, beginning with only thirty
followers, but his forces quickly expanded and he was eventually able to coordinate the
resistance throughout the entire Northeast of Afghanistan.
Massoud had an education, which boosted his reputation and gave him expertise. He
spent a lot of his free time studying guerilla military tactics and developed an organization
around his theories. He focused on hit and run attacks on weak targets, rather than the traditional
focus on continued attacks on large protected targets. This earned him a great deal of success and
further renown.
He organized the resistance in a way that made his strategy effective, but also created an
institutional structure in the region. He organized his military forces into three types of groups:
stationary groups to hold territory, mobile groups to go where necessary, and mobile strike
forces. He then divided the Panjshir valley into military districts in which a band of stationary
forces maintained security. These districts then served as functional political districts, each with
economic and political committees and judges, and a committee of religious authority. He was
therefore able to establish institutions and extend them throughout his territory by relying on his
military structure.
Massoud was an effective politician who created an effective bureaucracy around
himself. He was said to have been constantly listening to others to collect intelligence and
council, as well as delegating tasks. In addition to establishing a functional bureaucracy, this
made his organization more resistant to decapitation. By creating a formal structure, he
transferred his personal power and personal ties to the organization, allowing it to continue even
after his death. His military organization therefore created the framework for a government
structure that could expand as his territory expanded, and that could survive him. He was not
only able to create a following around his charismatic personality, but to routinize the
organization.
Massoud had tremendous success consolidating power throughout the Northeast of
Afghanistan. He was always willing to talk to the press, which helped gain him familiarity both
domestically among the population and the elite, and internationally. Why, then, was he unable
to capture and keep Kabul, and to extend influence to the south?
Massoud was representative of the powerful actors in the north. He attempted to gain
some representation over other ethnic groups by co-opting commanders, but these alliances were
weak and subject to disruption. He was never truly able to represent any group other than the
Tajiks, and most closely represented the more elite Panjshiri Tajiks. Among the Tajiks, he had
legitimacy and a centralized state-like organization, but he was unable to do more than co-opt
commanders as allies in other regions, or to gain sufficient support where Tajiks were neither the
elite nor the majority.
The military success of the Panjshiris did award them a certain amount of status as they
enjoyed relative spoils, but this material success could not overcome historical Pashtun feelings
of superiority. As a whole, the Pashtuns consider themselves the true Afghans and resent the rise
of any other ethnic group. The Panjshiris never did gain control of the country or surpass Pashtun
power, but they were able to close the gap, threatening the Pashtuns. Today, the Pashtuns enjoy
the executive and maintain primacy within the country, but they are still wary of Panjshiri power
and make claims that the government is under Panjshiri control. Within Kabul, the two groups
dress differently and often self segregate, signifying that there still is deep rooted resentment and
conflict23 . For the Pashtuns, any Panjshiri power is too much Panjshiri power. Resistance to an
ethnic reversal of power was too great for Massoud to overcome.
Gulbuhdin Hekmatyar, Hizb-i-Islami
Gulbuhdin Hekmatyar controlled Hizb-i-Islami (Hizb), the predominant Pashtun
24
resistance group . He used a different strategy to consolidate power. Rather than winning
unified support as a loved representative of the region, he used clientalism and patronage ties to
consolidate control. This was effective because of the tribal nature of the region. Villages and
tribes were used to experiencing some level of autonomy under the old regime, but when the
king fell and the soviets started taking power, the village and tribal elders were less willing to
support the central authority. Hekmatyar was able to co-opt the support of local leaders by
alliances of convenience, threat, and payment. They either had similar goals as him, were bullied
into supporting him, or were incentivized with aid. He kept power by either pitting groups that
became too powerful against one another, or conveniently not coming to their aid if they were
attacked.
Creating this patronage network allowed Hekmatyar to maintain relative stability in the
region, or at least manageable chaos, while nominally claiming the support of a plurality of the
Afghan people. Unlike in Massoud's heartland, commanders throughout his territory had shifting
alliances, but he always maintained control among enough to keep a majority and to fuel his own
power.
Hekmatyar's claimed representation of the Pashtune was necessary for him to maintain
his relative bargaining position among the other major parties, especially in Peshawar and when
seeking support and aid abroad. This allowed him to collect extensive aid from Pakistan, which
23 While in Kabul, where Tajiks and Pashtuns both reside, I was warned to stay away from the boys wearing
Kufeyas because they were allegedly Panjshiri. Pashtun girls also often wore a different style of headscarf.
24 The ways he addressed the obstacles associated with leadership irregularity are summarized in Appendix C.
in turn allowed him to fund his campaigns and remain successful. He could support claims to
power by saying that he had majority support.
He was Pashtun, which earned him credibility and some level of legitimacy among the
Pashtuns, but only because he was Pashtun. The fact that he had the support was irrelevant, if
another Pashtun came along, they could take away his support. He could ally with other ethnic
groups, as long as Pashtuns did not lose their perceived power. Hekmatyar lacked the charisma
necessary to tie his supporters to him, and as a result experienced a lot of in-fighting. He was
more concerned with maintaining his own power than with consolidating a stable governing
body, and pitted internal groups against one another, at times forcing them to seek alliances with
other parties such as the Taliban or Jamiat.
Hizb did provide institutions within the south. Like in the north, there were some schools
and hospitals, there was a tax system, and even a postal system. However, the military structure
was more patronage based than Massoud's, and he failed to develop a centralized authority.
As evidence of his lack of Charisma, Hekmatyar is not remembered fondly today. His
picture is not put up in the streets, the Pashtuns do not speak positively of him or recount his
valor. Even the Taliban are remembered more positively than he is. Unlike the Tajiks in the
north, who claim Massoud as their hero, the Pashtuns in Kabul say today say that none of the
warlords were any good. He was not well liked enough, or militarily powerful enough, for his
organization to be sustainable.
Hekmatyar did manage to create a patronage network that could conceivably have
allowed stability to develop if the correct steps were taken, but he was unable to extend control
because he lacked the charisma to unify the Pashtuns to victory. In order to maintain his own
personal power, he acted divisively. Even though he technically represented the country's elite,
he failed to mobilize them to take control in areas where they were not the majoriy.
Because the Hekmatyar sought complete primacy, he was never willing to participate in
any of the deals offered by other commanders in their attempts to make a unified government.
Several attempts were made, some prompted by the Peshawar leaders and others by the regional
commanders, but Hekymatyar wanted all or nothing and had enough power as the Pashtun
representative to spoil attempts at unification. He was unwilling to permit not only an ethnic
reversal of power, but any shift in the relative power.
Hekmatyar was successful in the south because he had developed personal ties
domestically and abroad that gave him a patronage network of support, and access to funds and
weapon, but he was unable to extend control beyond his region because he failed to create an
effective, centralize bureaucracy or to gain enough legitimacy to create a unified Pashtun
movement.
Mullah Mohammad Omar, Taliban
There are several origin stories for how the Taliban came into existence. They all begin in
a Madrasa along the Pakistani border. Young Afghan refugees were not allowed to attend normal
public school, so they were educated in Islamic schools where they could learn to read and write.
In one such Islamic school, the headmaster, Mullah Omar, decided that he wanted to go to Jihad
and brought his students and a small band of supporters with him.
What happened next is a little hazy. The Taliban went to the south of Afghanistan, either
of their own volition, or because Pakistan requested that they do so. Pakistan was attempting to
open a trade route through Afghanistan, but the first caravan to be sent had been captured. One
possibility is that the Taliban freed the caravan out of the goodness of their hearts. Another is
that Pakistan requested that they do so in order to save face after the Caravan was taken. A third
possibility is that the capture of the Caravan was a setup by the ISI, used to introduce the Taliban
to the Afghan civil war scene and help them gain legitimacy. Whether or not the capture of the
caravan was setup by the ISI, the action did gain them notice and legitimacy as one a notable
player in the Afghan civil war.
They also derived legitimacy from their religious origins. Mullah Omar had authority as a
religious figure. Talib is the Arabic word for student, and "-an" is the Persian plural suffix, so
their name means the students. This is a reference to being students of Islam. Mullah Omar was
not actually a learned Islamic scholar, he never actually received extensive training and did not
have more than an elementary education, but he was still perceived as an Islamic authority and
was respected as a Mullah. His deficient education led him to create a unique interpretation,
similar to but not the same as the Deobandi tradition from which he came.
Mullah Omar was not an inherently charismatic figure, but he overcame this with his
religious appeal. He earned the respect of those he met not because he was a good speaker or had
a winning smile, but because he gave a pious impression that successfully impressed religious
Afghans and foreign patrons. He also began not as an absolute leader, but as the head of a
council which allowed newly co-opted local commanders and local elite to feel represented. This
served to make him more accessible and thus more familiar and trustworthy. As the Taliban
grew, Mullah Omar gradually became more absolute and secured more control in his own hands.
He became the Amir al-Muminin, the commander of the faithful. This was a religious title of
extreme importance, making him a holy figure and allowing him to command the same
dedication over his followers as a charismatic personality.
2 The ways he addressed the obstacles associated with leadership irregularity in order to consolidate power across
the country are summarized in Appendix C.
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At first, the Taliban went unnoticed by the other major commanders. As new players,
they had not yet had a great enough impact to warrant notice as a threat. Despite their lack of
attention from the major commanders, the Taliban gradually started making connections in the
south and building up a network of supporters. This was especially possible in the South because
of the clientalistic way that Hekmatyar had structured his territory. The local commanders were
not loyal to Hekmatyar, and were easily swayed by the Taliban. Local commanders were co-
opted in several ways. Often, the Taliban possessed military superiority and Hekmatyar failed to
support his commanders when the Taliban threatened them. Some joined the Taliban because of
ideological ties. Others were bought off. Those groups that were not ideologically tied to the
Taliban were disarmed to prevent further opposition.
The Taliban were more successful at truly representing the Pashtuns than Hekmatyar had
been. By the time the Taliban were formed, Hekmatyar was well established in the region, but he
failed to utilize the advantage that his familiarity and prominence gave him. His prominence
made him the clear leader to whom others supporting his cause might have deferred had there
been a unifying entity to which to defer. But Hekmatyar never formed a centralized structure.
Instead, he relied on clientalistic, impersonal connections that were subject to dissolution. He
pitted local groups against one another in order to maintain his primacy, rather than building a
coalition of support. When the Taliban came, Hekmatyar failed to support the local commanders
against their attack, thereby driving them into Taliban hands. For example, in January of 1995,
Hiz attacked governor Qari Baba in hopes of pre-empting a Taliban attack. The attack just served
to drive Qari Baba into an alliance with the Taliban.
The Taliban, on the other hand, had all of the same representative attributes as Hekmatyar
and more. They were Pashtun and their religious claims were stronger than Hekmatyar's. They
nominally represented all Pashtuns, but Mullah Omar and the majority of his council were
Durrani, the higher status sub-tribe within the Pashtuns. They slowly spread through the region,
making personal ties and strengthening their representativeness. Rather than pitting groups
against one another, they were able to either co-opt groups and gain their support, or to defeat
groups militarily when Hekmatyar failed to come to their rescue. Those groups that did not
willingly commit to the Taliban were disarmed rather than bullied into joining so that the Taliban
were less subject to the same type of loss of support that they were encouraging for Hezb.
Mullah Omar included the relatively powerful commanders within his council, and made those
that were not included less powerful.
As they took villages, the Taliban left policing and judicial systems. They created an
organization for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. Although the group was
vicious, it was relatively egalitarian. It took power away from the elites, but was unobjectionable
at first because, in a time when crime was rampant, it created a level of stability. The violence
was predictable rather than arbitrary, meaning that it could be avoided. This promoted their
rational legitimacy-Hekmatyar left crime and disorder in his territory, but the Taliban brought
stability. They were viewed as the better choice.
By the time the other major commanders had taken notice of the Taliban, it was too late
to stop their momentum. Pakistan shifted much of its support away from Hekmatyar and to the
Taliban, providing them with weapons and intelligence support. The Taliban were able to
overcome the south, reducing Hezb to an external front organization with little real power
domestically.
The Taliban represented the Pashtuns, but they made attempts to represent others as well.
Like Massoud, they attempted to co-opt members of other ethnic groups and emphasized their
positions in order to appear multi-ethnic and enhance their claims of representing all of
Afghanistan. They made religious appeals, claiming that they were going to create an Islamic
Emirate for all of Afghanistan, not just the Pashtuns.
This appeal did not work as well in the rest of Afghanistan as it did in the South because
the major commanders in the other region had more centralized structures and greater stability.
Their promise of stability was less convincing in regions such as Herat, where the heart of the
territory was demilitarized and had some normalcy. In Herat, Mazar, and the Panjshir valley,
society continued, life went on despite the war raging along the boundaries of the different
regions and in Kabul. There was less of a need for the Taliban to come create stability, and the
populous in those regions were more content with their leaders. In Herat, for example, Ismail
Khan enjoyed wild public support-despite being defeated several times, he was able to recreate
a militia every time he returned to his territory, and when he was removed as governor under the
Karzai administration, there were major protests and demonstrations. The Heratis were less than
eager for a new party to take power and disrupt their stability. In Mazar, the locals were less
loyal to their commander, Dostum, but enjoyed the stability he had created in the city and also
opposed the Taliban.
Various lower level commanders in the North and East joined with the Taliban for
periods of time as they vied for greater influence in their region, but they never shared the same
ideological ties that they did with those in the south. The Taliban failed to gain the support of the
populations, or the local elite. For example, Abdul Malik defected to the Taliban in order to
increase his influence in the area and get revenge on Dostum, whom he blamed for his brother's
death, only to switch sides again later.
Despite challenges in the north, Mullah Omar was on the verge of controlling the entire
country in 2001 when the US invaded. They were able to take control because, unlike
Hekmatyar, they had unified the elite Pashtuns. Once they had fully utilized that power, they
were able to win the war.
The Taliban were a new force that swept the country and nearly ended decades of
fighting. They succeeded where others had failed by unifying the elite constituency, earning
legitimacy through providing stability in the south and through military victories, extending their
claims of representation to all Muslims and winning even some non-Pashtun support, and
through creating formal policing institutions that were able to hold control over the regions that
they had already conquered. In areas where there was no strong governance, they were able to
win rational legitimacy by creating a reputation for creating relative stability and predictability.
In areas that had been controlled by other leaders, they were able to use military victories and to
extend the policing institutions they had created in order to maintain relative order.
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Conclusion
The selection effects endogenous to the leadership regularity and state failure are too
great to be able to make strong causal claims. However, leadership regularity was shown to
predict considerable variation in state failure duration. It acts as a good proxy for many factors
and assets that regular leaders tend to have access to, but irregular leaders tend not to.
Irregular leadership changes lead to a shift in power between two groups, potentially
causing a status reversal. Social identity theory predicts that a leader from a high status group is
more likely to viewed positively than leaders from a low status group. Status reversals can lead
to violence because a group previously holding power, with resources, connections, and
expectations, is then removed from power. Because humans are loss averse, this group is likely
to oppose the new leader in order to regain power. Similarly, because humans are risk averse, a
known leader might be more preferable to an uncertain irregular leader. If a group decides to
take a risk and support an irregular leader into power, it is because they expect a pay off high
enough to make the risk worthwhile. The irregular leader then has the added pressure of meeting
the elevated expectations of its constituency without access to the spoils that the old leader had
accumulated while in office.
While it cannot be taken for granted that irregular leaders will not have access to the
institutions that were available to regular leader, it can be argued that they might have a more
restricted access. Institutions such as the military might support the old leader and the loss of
supporters for the old leader might leave the bureaucracy suffering. This added challenge will
make it more difficult for an irregular leader to establish themselves and to provide security and
benefits to the population, making them more likely to face opposition.
Irregular leaders are also less likely to have the experience and power of old leaders.
While irregular leaders might have access to formal institutions left over from the old regime,
Laila Wahedi Conclusion
they are unlikely to have access to informal means of projecting power and wealth extraction.
For example, they are less likely to have the personal ties and access into licit and illicit markets
that the old leader might have enjoyed. International alliances may also shift. The irregular leader
will be left floundering to catch up while an old leader could have been dedicating his efforts to
restoring stability.
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Appendix A: Summary of Factors Related to Leadership Regularity
VS:
Ethnic Fractionalization
V3:
Ethnic Power Shift
V6:
Conflict drawn
on ethnic lines
Representative of Ethnic Majority
VT EV: Leader Regularity v2:urai trnt
Legitimnacy IV: Failure Durationsrauatctent
Appendix A: Summary of Factors Relating to Leadership Regularity
Shorter
Failure Duration
Key:
Variables
Duration
Appendix B: List of Cases
Year
Failure
Country Began Treatment
Albania 1997 Regular
Algeria 1962 Regular
Azerbaijan 1988 Regular
Bosnia 1992 Regular
Burundi 1972 Regular
Cambodia 1979 Regular
China 1956 Regular
China 1966 Regular
China 1988 Regular
Colombia 1975 Regular
Congo-Kinshasa 1977 Regular
Croatia 1991 Regular
Cyprus 1963 Regular
Djibouti 1991 Regular
Egypt 1992 Regular
Guinea 2000 Regular
India 1956 Regular
India 1967 Regular
India 1983 Regular
Indonesia 1949 Regular
Indonesia 1967 Regular
Indonesia 1975 Regular
Indonesia 1997 Regular
Iraq 1959 Regular
Iraq 1974 Regular
Iraq 1980 Regular
Iraq 1991 Regular
Israel 1987 Regular
Jordan 1970 Regular
Kenya 1964 Regular
Kenya 1991 Regular
Lebanon 1958 Regular
Liberia 1985 Regular
Liberia 2000 Regular
Moldova 1992 Regular
Morocco 1975 Regular
Mozambique 1976 Regular
Nepal 1996 Regular
Nicaragua 1981 Regular
Pakistan 1971 Regular
Papua New Guinea 1989 Regular
Peru 1982 Regular
Romania 1989 Regular
Russia 1994 Regular
Russia 1999 Regular
Rwanda 1963 Regular
Senegal 1992 Regular
Somalia 1988 Regular
South Africa 1984 Regular
SriLanka 1983 Regular
Syria 1979 Regular
Uganda 1966 Regular
Yugoslavia 1991 Regular
Zambia 1964 Regular
Zimbabwe 1972 Regular
Zimbabwe 1981 Regular
Afghanistan 1978 Irregular
Algeria 1991 Irregular
Angola 1975 Irregular
Bangladesh 1976 Irregular
Burundi 1988 Irregular
Cambodia 1970 Irregular
Chad 1965 Irregular
Colombia 1948 Irregular
Congo-Brazzaville 1997 Irregular
Congo-Kinshasa 1960 Irregular
Congo-Kinshasa 1992 Irregular
Cuba 1956 Irregular
Cyprus 1974 Irregular
Dominican Republic 1965 Irregular
El Salvador 1979 Irregular
Ethiopia 1961 Irregular
Georgia 1991 Irregular
Guatemala 1966 Irregular
Guinea-Bissau 1998 Irregular
Hungary 1956 Irregular
Iran 1977 Irregular
Iraq 1961 Irregular
Laos 1960 Ireuar
Lebanon 1975 Irregular
Liberia 1989 Irregular
Mali 1990 Irregular
Myanmar (Burma) 1948 Irregular
Nicaragua 1978 Irregular
Nigeria 1966 Irregular
Nigeria 1980 Irregular
Oman 1970 Irregular
Pakistan 1973 Irregular
Pakistan 1983 Irregular
Philippines 1972 Irregular
Rwanda 1990 Irregular
Sierra Leone 1991 Irregular
Sudan 1956 Irregular
Sudan 1983 Irregular
Tajikistan 1992 Irregular
Thailand 1965 Irregular
Turkey 1984 Irregular
Uganda 1980 Irregular
Vietnam South 1958 Irregular
Yemen 1962 Irregular
Yemen Peoples Republic 1986 Irregular
Ethiopia 1999 Dropped
Iraq 2003 Dropped
Pakistan 2004 Dropped
Rwanda 2001 Dropped
Sudan 2003 Dropped
Thailand 2004 Dropped
Turkey 2004 Dropped
United Kingdom (North
Ireland) 1971 Dropped
Yemen 1994 Dropped
Yemen 2004 Dropped
Yugoslavia 1998 Dropped
Appendix C: Summary of Afghan Leaders' Approaches to the Obstacles Related to
Leadership Irregularity
Taraki, Amin, Karmal
Yes. Bloodless coup,
retained bureaucracy.
Continuity of Yes.
Development
Personal Yes. He was Prime
experience Minister
Familiarity Yes. Prince and former
Prime Minister
Domestic Yes. Retained ties from
Personal Ties tenure as Prime Minister
International Yes. Alliances did not
Ties shift.
Representative Yes. Durrani,
of Elite Muhamazai, Pashtun
Traditional Yes. He was a Prince.
Rational Yes, initially Built
platform on development.
Charismatic Somewhat. Initial popular
appeal
Functioning
Bureaucracy
No, purged opponents in
favor of partisans.
Continuity of No, US development aid
Development , ceased, new development
programs failed.
Personal No.
experience
Familiarity No. Small base of support,
came out of nowhere.
Domestic No.
Personal Ties
International Yes. Supported by USSR,
Ties but opposed by US,
Pakistan, and Iran.
Elite No. Atheist or
unconvincingly religious,
antagonized the
intellectual elite, attempted
to represent low status
minority groups rather
than Pashtuns.
Traditional No.
Rational No. Policies were
ineffective.
Charismatic No. All were disliked.
Daoud:
Functioning
Bureaucracy
Yes. Was able to create one.
Continuity of Not Applicable
Development
Personal No, but made up for it by
experience studying insurgency and
governing strategy
Familiarity Yes. Traveled the country
to fight with many groups.
In the press.
Domestic Yes. Gained through Jamiat
Personal Ties and travel.
International Yes. Gained through Jamiat
Ties
Elite Consolidated control in
north where he represented
the local ethnic elite.
Unable to extend control to
the south where he did not
represent the elite.
Traditional No. He was not from the
Muhammadzai clan.
Rational Yes. He created functioning
governing institutions
within his territory, and
attempted to create a power
sharing democracy for the
whole country.
Charismatic Yes. Had charismatic
appeal as a hero.
Hekmatyar
Functioning
Bureaucracy
Somewhat. Had
governance institutions,
but they were less
centralized.
Continuity of Not Applicable
Development
Personal No.
experience
Familiarity Yes. He was well known
because he was the head of
one of the major parties
Domestic Yes. Developed a
Personal Ties clientalistic network
International Yes. Head of Hizb-i-
Ties Islami. Received funds
from US and Pakistan.
Elite Yes. Represented the
Pashtuns
Traditional Some. He was not a
member of the royal
family, but was a Pashtun
warlord, so had some local
traditional legitimacy
Rational No. Spoiler who upset
attempts at unified
government.
Charismatic No. Did not have the same
personal appeal as others
such as Massoud and
Ismail Khan.
Massoud
Functioning
Bureaucracy
Mullah Omar
Functioning
Bureaucracy
Continuity of Not Applicable-- though he
Development did promote development
by removing road blocks
and establishing rule of law
Personal No.
experience
Familiarity No. Mullah Omar and the
Taliban came out of
nowhere.
Domestic Yes. He led a grassroots
Personal Ties movement in which he
made personal ties as he
expanded. Important leaders
were invited to join his
council.
International Yes. Had support of
Ties Pakistan and the US.
Elite Yes. Mullah Omar was
Durrani Pashtun, as was the
majority of his council.
Attempted to represent
other groups by co-opting
commanders into council.
Traditional Yes. Created traditional
legitimacy using religious
claims.
Rational Yes. Established rule of
law. Violence was
predictable rather than
arbitrary.
Charismatic Yes. Created a personality
cult around himself as a
religious leader. Became
"Commander of the
Faithful."
Yes. Had a council of elders
and left governing
institutions in place
whenever they took
territory.
